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ABSTRACT
Three Essays in Comparative Political Economy
by
Ozdemir, Ugur
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science,
Washington University in St. Louis, August, 2012.
Professor Randall Calvert and Nathan M. Jensen, Co-chairs
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters offer game theoretical
models for different linkages between political parties and the citizens: programmatic
linkage and clientelistic linkage. Empirical implications of these models are discussed
using real world data on Turkey and USA through statistical analysis and simulation.
The last chapter steps back from the specific strategies of political agents to examine
in a more general context the concepts of institutional maintenance and institutional
change.
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PREFACE
I did my undergraduate study in Industrial Engineering. Although I was in top
200 in a country-wide entrance exam taken by more than 1 million students, I was
quite unsuccessful as an engineering student. The reason was clear: at the end of
the first semester it had turned out that I did not like what I study. I wanted to
be a social scientist. Who was to blame? After thinking and reading for quite a
long time I had found the answer: institutions ! The education institutions which
were unsuccessful in discovering what I wanted and directing me in that direction,
and my family, as an informal institution, who always motivated me for the highest
score in the exams, not the highest level of happiness. I was lucky though. Another
previously unhappy engineer who had become a very successful social scientist, M.
Remzi Sanver, held my hand and I wrote a M.Sc thesis about Arrow’s Theorem. At
the end of that two years, it was all clear to me: mathematical social science was
the shortest possible summary of what I would like to do in the rest of my life and
institutions will have to be in the picture. And I ended up at one of the best possible
places for this purpose.
Starting the PhD program in Washington University was scary (I had not taken a
single Political Science course before) but very exciting. With Douglas North living
upstairs, Randall Calvert and Norman Schofield living next door, it was a heaven for
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me. I still remember how I got excited when Dr. Schofield was talking about why
financial crises was a singularity.
Apart from providing me a distinguished education and research vision, my de-
partment provided a family-like environment and I spent 5 great years in St.Louis.
Finally, I was starting to feel that what I want to do and what I do are the one and
the same thing. This thesis is a focal point in this long effort, which took me almost
ten years to accomplish.
xii
1. Introduction
What links citizens to political parties or candidates? The democratic theorists argue
that citizens vote for a platform hence between political candidates in order to exercise
political authority make rulers accountable to the citizens [Kitschelt and Wilkinson,
2007b]. This responsible party model ignores a quite a different type of party-voter
linkage which exists even in the advanced industrial democracies: the clientelistic
linkage. The most common way of establishing this linkage is through direct material
benefits transfered to voters who trade their votes for a price. The first two chapters
of this thesis offer theoretical models for these two different linkages between political
parties and the citizens and analyzes their empirical implications through statistical
analysis and simulation. These two chapters focus on the possibility and the structure
of equilibria -hence stability- in political systems. The last chapter steps back from
the specific strategies of a given party to examine in a more general context the
concepts of institutional maintenance and institutional change.
The spatial model of voting has been the dominant approach to electoral politics
since it was first introduced [Downs, 1957]. In this model voters have preferences
over some salient policy dimensions. Office seeking parties and politicians announce
electoral platforms they commit to enact if elected, and voters opt for the program
which they are closest to. The important theoretical question is than that given
1
a set of voters, what should we expect to observe in terms policy choices of the
political candidates? The theoretical prediction is that the political candidates should
converge to the electoral mean [Schofield, 2004]. This result, known as the median
voter theorem, however is not in accord with the empirical observations [Schofield
and Sened, 2006].
One way of explaining this contradictory nature focuses on the concept of valence.
It was Stokes, 1963 who introduced the concept of valence in a very famous critique.
In a later work, Stokes, 1992 defines valence issues as issues, on which parties or
leaders are differentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they
are linked in the publics mind with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost
everyone approves or disapproves”. The consequence of introducing the valence term
in the analysis is that when all candidates choose the mean of the electoral distribution
as their position, they are not going to be treated as identical by the voters. Hence
the convergence to the mean will not be an optimum vote maximizing strategy for
all candidates.
Since Stokes’ original work, different interpretations of the valence concept have
emerged. While some scholars, staying closer to Stokes’ original definition, equate the
term with policy related factors [Budge and Farlie, 1983,Be´langer and Meguid, 2008],
others used it to refer to nonpolicy related factors [Fiorina, 1978,Enelow and Hinich,
1982, Alvarez and Nagler, 1995, Grose, 2005, Clark, 2009]. In the former approach,
voters evaluate the candidates on the basis of competence in handling issues rather
than their platforms on the issue space. In the latter approach, valence refers to voters
2
judgements about positively or negatively evaluated aspects of candidates, or party
leaders, which cannot be ascribed to the policy choice of the party or the candidate.
Chapter 11 uses a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates
are differentiated by differing valences— the electoral perception of the quality of
the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a
convergence coefficient, defined in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be
bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be
a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002.
Chapter 2 extends the model in Chapter 1 to handle endogenous valences in order
to provide a theoretical framework for the clientelistic linkage based on distribution of
materialistic benefits. This chapter introduces a spatial model which formalizes clien-
telistic linkage as valence-buying phenomenon. The model allows for the existence
of more than one machine party. Moreover the policy choice of the political parties
and their decision regarding to whom to bribe and how much are simultaneously
determined in the equilibrium subject to their budget constraints. This approach
opens the way to many interesting comparative statics which in fact do have implica-
tions outside the vote-buying literature, such as the controversial subject of bribing
in international organizations. Using simulation techniques we illustrate how budget
differentials among parties affect the political equilibrium.
1This chapter is co-authored with Norman Schofield. The author is solely responsible for data
collection, statistical analysis, calculations, coding and simulations. Sections on Turkey politics are
co-written.
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The first two chapters studies the possibility and the structure of equilibria -
hence stability- in political systems. Change however is a natural characteristic of
any sociopolitical system. In particular, while a party organization persists, it pursues
certain policy positions (and a pattern of changes in those positions), partly at the
behest of its particular activists and partly in reaction to the moves of other parties.
From time to time, however, those organizations or coalitions break up and recombine,
a classic instance of institutional change. Chapter 3 offers a model of institutional
change and persistence as a generalization of this phenomenon.
4
2. A Stochastic Model of Elections in Turkey1
2.1 Introduction
The early work in modeling elections focused on two-party competition, and as-
sumed a one-dimensional policy space, X, and “deterministic” voter choice. The
models showed the existence of a “core” point, unbeaten under majority rule vote,
at the median of the electoral distribution. Such models implied that there would
be strong centripetal political forces causing parties to converge to the electoral
center [Hotelling, 1929, Downs, 1957]. In higher dimensions, such two party “pure
strategy Nash equilibria” (PNE) generally do not exist, so the theory did not cover
empirical situations where two or more policy dimensions were relevant.2 It has been
shown, however, that there would exist mixed strategy Nash equilibria whose support
lies within a subset of the policy space known as the “uncovered set.”3 “Attractors” of
the political process, such as the “core”, the “uncovered set” or the “heart” [Schofield,
1999] are centrally located with respect to the distribution of voters’ ideal points. The
theoretical prediction that political candidates converge to the center is very much at
1This chapter is co-authored with Norman Schofield. The author is solely responsible for data
collection, statistical analysis, calculations, coding and simulations. Sections on Turkey politics are
co-written. Some findings in this chapter have appeared in [Schofield et al., 2009].
2See [Saari, 1997] and the survey in [Austen-Smith and Banks, 2000].
3 [Banks and Duggan, 2006].
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odds with empirical evidence from U.S. presidential elections that political candidates
do not locate themselves close to the electoral center.4
The deterministic electoral model is also ill-suited to deal with the multiparty case.
(Here multiparty refers to the situation where the number of candidates or parties, p,
is at least three.) As a result, recent work has focused on “stochastic” models which
are, in principle, compatible with empirical models of voter choice.5 In such models,
the behavior of each voter is modeled by a vector of choice probabilities. Various
theoretical results for this class of models suggested that vote maximizing parties
would converge to the mean of the electoral distribution of voter ideal points.6
Empirical estimates of party positions in European multiparty polities can be con-
structed on the basis of various techniques of content analysis of party manifestos.7
More recent analyses have been based on factor analysis of electoral survey data to
obtain a multidimensional description of the main political issues in various countries.
All these empirical analyses have obtained policy spaces that are two dimensional.
These techniques allow for the estimation of the positions of the parties in the em-
pirically inferred policy space. These estimates have found no general tendency for
parties to converge to the center.8
The various empirical electoral models can be combined with simulation tech-
niques to determine how parties should respond to electoral incentives in order to
4 [Poole and Rosenthal, 1984]; [Schofield et al., 2003]. See also the empirical work in [Schofield
et al., 2011].
5 [Schofield and Sened, 2006].
6 [Hinich, 1977]; [Lin et al., 1999]; [Banks and Duggan, 2005]; [McKelvey and Patty, 2006].
7See [Laver and Hunt, 1992]. [Benoit and Laver, 2006] use expert estimates.
8 [Adams and Merril III, 1999], for example.
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maximize their vote shares. [Schofield and Sened, 2006], in their simulation of elec-
tions in Israel in the period 1988 to 1996, found that vote maximizing parties did
not converge to the electoral origin. It may be objected that factor analysis of sur-
vey data gives only a crude estimate of the variation in voter preferences, while vote
maximization disregards the complex incentives that parties face. Nonetheless, as
a modeling exercise, the stochastic model for Israel seemed to provide a plausible
account of the nature of individual choice9 as well as the party positioning decision.
Although the simulated equilibrium positions of the parties in Israel were not identi-
cal to the estimated positions, the positions were generally far from the origin, and
for some of the parties very close to their estimated positions. The purpose of this
paper is to attempt to extend the stochastic empirical model so as to close the ap-
parent disparity between the simulated equilibrium positions of the parties, and the
estimated positions.
The key to the contradiction between the non-convergence result of Schofield and
Sened, and the convergence result in other work on the formal stochastic model was
the incorporation of an asymmetry in the perception of the quality of the party
leaders, expressed in terms of valence [Stokes, 1992,Stokes, 1963].
In the model presented here, the average weight, in the voter calculus, given to
the perceived quality of the leader of the jth party is called the party’s intrinsic or
exogenous valence. In empirical models this valence is assumed to be exogenous, so
it is independent of the party’s position. The valence coefficients for each party are
9Over 60% of the individual votes were correctly modeled.
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generated by the estimation of the stochastic model, based on the “multinomial logit”
(MNL) assumption that the stochastic errors have a “Type I extreme value or Gumbel
distribution” [Dow and Endersby, 2004]. These valence terms add to the statistical
significance of the model. In general, valence reflects the overall degree to which the
party is perceived to have shown itself able to govern effectively in the past, or is
likely to be able to govern well in the future. 10
Appendix A considers a pure spatial stochastic vote model,with party specific ex-
ogenous valences, based on the same distribution assumption, and on the assumption
that each party leader attempts to locally maximize the party’s vote share. Results
from [Schofield and Miller, 2007], [Schofield, 2006] give the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which there is a “local pure strategy Nash equilibrium” (LNE) of
this model at the joint electoral mean (that is, where each party adopts the same
position, z0, at the mean of the electoral distribution).
11 Theorem 2 in Appendix
A shows that a “convergence coefficient”, c, incorporating all the parameters of the
model, can be defined. This coefficient, c, involves the differences in the valences
of the party leaders, and the “spatial coefficient” β. When the policy space, X, is
10See [Penn, 2009]. Notice, however, that valence refers to the perception by voters of the quality
of political leaders. Recent work by [Westen, 2007], for the United States, suggests that voters’
perceptions of the characteristics of political candidates are very important. Moreover, [Schofield
et al., 2009] shows that voter perception of character traits has a strong effect on candidate positions
in the United States.
11A local Nash equilibrium under vote maximization is just a vector of positions such that no
small unilateral move by a party can increase its vote. The usual notion of a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (PNE) cannot be used because in the games we study there may exist no PNE.
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assumed to be of dimension w, then the necessary condition for existence of an LNE
at the electoral center12 is that the coefficient, c, is bounded above by w.
When the necessary condition fails, then parties, in equilibrium, will adopt diver-
gent positions. Because a pure strategy Nash equilibrium must be an LNE, the failure
of existence of LNE when all parties are at the electoral mean implies non existence
of such a centrist PNE. In this case, a party whose leader has the lowest valence will
have the greatest electoral incentive to move away from the electoral mean. As the
party moves away from the electoral mean, it increases the probability that voters on
the electoral periphery will vote for it.13 Other low valence parties will follow suit,
and the local equilibrium will be one where parties are distributed along a “princi-
pal electoral axis.”14 The general conclusion is that, with all other parameters fixed,
then a convergent LNE can be guaranteed only when β is “sufficiently” small. Thus,
divergence away from the electoral mean becomes more likely the greater are β, the
valence differences and the variance of the electoral distribution.15
The innovation of this paper is that in additional to exogenous valence, we also
incorporate “sociodemographic valence.” These party specific valence terms are asso-
ciated with different groups in the society, and are defined by dichotomous or contin-
12Again, the electoral center, or origin, is defined to be the mean of the distribution of voter ideal
points.
13This follows for theoretical reasons as shown in [Schofield, 2006]. When c > w , at least one
of the eigenvalues of the Hessian of the vote share function of a low valence party will be large and
positive at the origin. As it moves from the origin, it will lose votes from centrist voters, but gain
votes from more radical voters. Simulation of empirical models for Israel [Schofield and Sened, 2006]
has shown this to be the case.
14The principal electoral axis is defined to be the one dimensional subspace along which the
variance of the distribution of voter ideal points is maximum.
15These results are presented for the reader’s convenience in the context of the more general
model described in Appendix A.
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Party Name . % Vote Seats % Seats
Democratic Left Party DSP 22.19 136 25
Nationalist Action Party MHP 17.98 129 23
Virtue Party FP 15.41 111 20
Motherland Party ANAP 13.22 86 16
True Path Party DYP 12.01 85 15
Republican People’s Party CHP 8.71 — —
People’s Democracy Party HADEP 4.75 — —
Others — 4.86 — —
Independents — 0.87 3 1
Total 550
Table 2.1
Turkish Election Results 1999
uous characteristics of different subgroups in the population. This model is shown to
be statistically superior to the spatial model with exogenous valence. This is the case
because the exogenous valence model assumes that all voters have the same percep-
tion of the quality of the party leaders, whereas with the sociodemographic variables,
these perceptions are allowed to vary across different subgroups.
We apply this valence model by considering in some detail a sequence of elections
in Turkey from 1999 to 2007. The election results are given in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3, which also provide the acronyms for the various parties.
As in other related work, the empirical models were based on factor analyses of
voter surveys.16 Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the electoral distributions (based on sample
16The estimations presented below are based on factor analyses of sample surveys conducted by
Veri Arastima for TUSES.
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Party Name % Vote Seats % Seats
Justice and Development Party AKP 34.28 363 66
Republican People’s Party CHP 19.39 178 32
True Path Party DYP 9.54 — —
Nationalist Action Party MHP 8.36 — —
Young Party GP 7.25 — —
People’s Democracy Party HADEP 6.22 — —
Motherland Party ANAP 5.13 — —
Felicity Party SP 2.49 — —
Democratic Left Party DSP 1.22 — —
Others and Independents — 6.12 9 2
—
Total 550
Table 2.2
Turkish Election Results 2002
Party Name % Vote Seats % Seats
Justice and Development Party AKP 46.6 340 61.8
Republican People’s Party CHP 20.9 112 20.3
Nationalist Movement Party MHP 14.3 71 12.9
Democrat Party DP 5.4 — —
Young Party GP 3.0 — —
Felicity Party SP 2.3 — —
Independents — 5.2 27 4.9
Others — 2.3 — —
Total 100 550 100
Table 2.3
Turkish Election Results 2007
11
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Figure 2.1. Party positions and voter distribution in Turkey in 1999
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Figure 2.2. Party positions and voter distribution in Turkey in 2002
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surveys of sizes 635 and 483 respectively) and estimates of party positions for 1999
and 2002.17 The two dimensions in both years were a “left-right” religion axis and
a “north-south” Nationalism axis, with secularism or “Kemalism” on the left and
Turkish nationalism to the north. (See also [Carkoglu and Hinich, 2006] for a spatial
model of the 1999 election).
Minor differences between these two figures include the disappearance of the
Virtue Party (FP) which was banned by the Constitutional Court in 2001, and the
change of the name of the pro-Kurdish party from HADEP to DEHAP.18 The most
important change is the appearance of the new Justice and Development Party (AKP)
in 2002, essentially substituting for the outlawed Virtue Party.
In 1999, a DSP minority government formed, supported by ANAP and DYP.
This only lasted about 4 months, and was replaced by a DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition,
indicating the difficulty of negotiating a coalition compromise across the disparate
policy positions of the coalition members. During the period 1999–2002, Turkey
experienced two severe economic crises. As Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show, the vote shares
of the parties in the governing coalition went from about 53 percent in 1999 to less
than 15 percent in 2002. In 2002, a 10% cut-off rule was instituted. As Table 2.3
makes clear, seven parties obtained less than 10% of the vote in 2002, and won no
seats. The AKP won 34% of the vote, but because of the cut-off rule, it obtained a
majority of the seats (363 out of 550). In 2007, the AKP did even better, taking about
17The party positions were estimated using expert analyses, in the same way as the work by
[Benoit and Laver, 2006].
18For simplicity, the pro-Kurdish party is denoted HADEP in the various Figures and Tables.
Notice that the HADEP position in Figures 1 and 2 is interpreted as secular and non-nationalistic.
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46% of the vote, against 21% for the CHP. The Kurdish Freedom and Solidarity Party
avoided the 10% cut-off rule, by contesting the elections as independent non-party
candidates, winning 24 seats with less that 5% of the vote.
The point of this example is that a comparison of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that
there was very little change in policy positions of the parties between 1999 and 2002.
The basis of support for the AKP may be regarded as a similar to that of the banned
FP, which suggests that the leader of this party changed the party’s policy position
on the religion axis, adopting a much less radical position.
In sum, the standard spatial model is unable to explain the change in the elec-
toral outcome, taken together with the relative unchanged positioning of the parties
between 1999 and 2002.
Section 2 of the chapter considers the details of the multinomial logit (MNL)
model for Turkey for 1999 and 2002. In particular, this section shows that the pure
spatial model with exogenous valence predicts that the parties diverge away from
the origin. To illustrate, Table 5 shows that the lowest valence party in 2002 was
the Motherland Party (ANAP) while the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had the
highest valence. The convergence coefficient was computed to be 5.94, far greater than
the upper bound of 2. Figure 2.3 presents an estimate of one of the LNE obtained
from simulation of vote maximizing behavior of the parties, under the assumption
of the pure spatial model with exogenous valence. As expected from the theoretical
result, the LNE is non centrist. Note however, the the LNE positions for the pure
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spatial model given in Figure 3 are quite different from the estimated positions in
Figure 2.2.
To improve the prediction of the model, we incorporated the sociodemographic
variables. Estimating the LNE for this sociodemographic model gave a better pre-
diction. To explain the difference between the estimated positions of the parties,
and the LNE from the sociodemographic model, we then added the the influence of
party activists to the model. Since sociodemographic variables can be interpreted
as specific valences associated with different subgroups of the electorate, we can use
these sociodemographic valences to estimate the influence of group-specific activists
on party positions.
Theorem 1 in Appendix A19 gives the first order balance condition for local equi-
librium in the stochastic electoral model involving sociodemographic valences and
activists. The condition requires the balancing of a centrifugal marginal activist pull
(or gradient) against a marginal electoral pull. In general, if the exogenous valence
of a party leader falls, then the marginal electoral pull also falls, so balance requires
that the leader adopt a position closer to the preferred position of the party activists.
The pure spatial model, with exogenous valences, and a joint model, with so-
ciodemographic valences, but without activists, are compared using simulation to
determine the LNE in these models. This allows us to determine which model better
explains the party positions. For example, Figure 2.4 shows the LNE based on a joint
sociodemographic model for 2002. In this figure, the LNE position for the Kurdish
19The results in the Appendix A extend the version of the activist model originally proposed
by [Aldrich, 1983] and developed in [Schofield, 2006].
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party, HADEP, is a consequence of the high electoral pull by Kurdish voters located
in the lower left of the figure. Similarly, the position of the CHP on the left of the
figure is estimated to be due to the electoral pull by Alevi voters who are Shia, rather
than Sunni and can be regarder as supporters of the secular state. Although Figure
2.4 gives a superior prediction of the party positions than Figure 2.3, there is still
a discrepancy between the estimated positions of Figure 2.2 and the LNE in Figure
2.4. We argue that the difference between these two vectors of party positions, as
presented in Figures 2.2 and 2.4, can be used to provide an estimation of the marginal
activist pulls influencing the parties.
More generally, we suggest that the combined model, with sociodemographic vari-
ables and activists, can be used as a tool with which to study the political configu-
ration of such a complex society. In the conclusion we suggest that the full model
involving activists may be applicable to the study of what [Epstein et al., 2006] call
“partial democracies”, where a political leader must maintain popular support, not
just by winning elections, but by maintaining the allegiance of powerful activist groups
in the society.
2.2 Elections in Turkey 1999-2007
Appendix A defines an empirical electoral model, denoted M(Λ, θ, β; V) which
utilizes socio-demographic variables, denoted θ.
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Figure 2.3. A Local Nash Equilibrium for the joint model in 2002
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The symbol,V, denotes a family of egalitarian vote functions, one for each party,
and under which all voters are counted equally. The formal model of Appendix A
considers a more general class of vote functions where the voters vary in their weights,
thus allowing for complex electoral rules. In Appendix A, the egalitarian family is
denoted Ve. The symbol, Ψ, denotes the Gumbel stochastic distribution on the errors.
To simplify notation in the applications that follow we delete reference to V and Ψ.
This empirical model asumes that the utility function of voter i is given by the
expression
uij(xi, zj) = Λj + (θj  ηi)− β‖xi − zj‖2 + εj.
Here, the spatial coefficient is denoted β and Λ ={Λj : j ∈ P} are the exogenous
valences (relative to a baseline party,k∗).20 The relative exogenous valence, Λj, gives
the average belief of the voters in the electorate concerning the quality of the leader of
party j in comparison to the leader of the baseline party, k∗. The symbol, θ, denotes
a set of m—vectors {θj} representing the effect of the m different sociodemographic
parameters (class, domicile, education, income, religious orientation, etc.) on the
beliefs of the various subgroups in the polity on the competence of party j. The
symbol ηi is an m-vector denoting the i
th individual’s relevant “sociodemographic”
characteristics. The composition (θj  ηi) is the scalar product and can be interpreted
as the group specific valence ascribed to party j as a consequence of the various
20Note that in the empirical models discussed below, these are specified relative to the baseline
party, the DYP.
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sociodemographic characteristics of voter i. Again, these sociodemographic variables
will be normalized with respect to the baseline party k∗, essentially by estimating
((θj − θk∗)  ηi). This scalar term is called the total sociodemographic valence of voter
i for party j. The tth term in this scalar is called the sociodemographic valence of i
as a result of membership by i of the tth group, or, more briefly, the tth group specific
sociodemographic valence for the leader of party j.21
The vector z = (z1, . . . , zp) ∈ Xp is the set of party positions, while x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Xn is the set of ideal points of the voters in N. When β is assumed zero then the
model is called pure sociodemographic (SD), and denoted M(Λ, θ). When {θj} are all
assumed zero then the model is called pure spatial, and denoted M(Λ, β). The pure
spatial model implicitly assumes that the ranking over valence is identical among vot-
ers.The empirical model, M(Λ, θ, β), including the sociodemographic terms is called
joint. These socio-demographic variables allow us to incorporate characteristics com-
mon to specific groups of supporters of any party, and this permits the valence ranking
to vary among voters in a way which depends on sociodemographics. Not account-
ing for these characteristics in the analysis will bias the estimates of the exogenous
valences of the parties.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 give the details of the pure spatial MNL models for the elections
of 1999 and 2002 in Turkey, while Tables 2.6 and 2.7 give the details of the joint MNL
21For example, in Table 6 and 7 there are 6 sociodemographic variables, so m = 6. An individual
who is Alevi has ηi,Alevi = 1. The coefficient for the CHP party for an Alevi is 3.089 in 1999, and this
is the group-specific valence that a voter who is a member of the group of Alevi voters has for this
party. Note again that this is specified relative to the baseline party, the DYP. These valences may
be the result of the perception of the leader’s ability, as displayed in the past, or of the particular
partiality of these voters to choose the party, independently of the party’s policy position.
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Party Name Λk Std.error t-value
Democratic Left Party DSP 0.724 0.153 4.73*
Nationalist Action Party MHP 0.666 0.147 4.53*
Virtue Party FP -0.159 0.175 0.9
Motherland Party ANAP 0.336 0.153 2.19
True Path Party DYP — — —
Republican People’s Party CHP 0.734* 0.178 4.12*
People’s Democracy Party HADEP -0.071 0.232 0.3
(Normalized with respect to DYP)
Spatial Coefficient β 0.375* 0.088 4.26*
Convergence Coefficient c 1.49 0.22 6.77*
n = 635
Log marginal likelihood (LML) = −1183
*=Significant with probability < 0.001.
Table 2.4
Pure Spatial Model of the Turkish Election 1999
models. The differences in log marginal likelihoods for the three different models then
gives the log Bayes’ factor for the pairwise comparisons.22 The log Bayes’ factors show
that the joint and pure spatial MNL models were clearly superior to the SD models.
In addition the joint models were superior to the pure spatial models.23 We can infer
that, though the sociodemographic variables are useful, by themselves they do not
give an accurate model of voter choice.24 It is necessary to combine the pure spatial
model, including the valence terms, with the sociodemographic valences to obtain a
superior estimation of voter choice.
22Since the Bayes’ factor [Kass and Raftery, 1995] for a comparison of two models is simply the
ratio of marginal likelihoods, the log Bayes’ factor is the difference in log likelihoods.
23The log Bayes factors for the joint models over the sociodemographic models were highly sig-
nificant at +31 in 1999 and +58 in 2002. The Bayes’ factors for the joint over the spatial models
were also significant, and estimated to be +6 and +5 in 1999 and 2002, respectively.
24Sociodemographic models are standard in the empirical voting literature.
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Party Name Λk Std. error t-value
Justice and Development Party AKP 0.78 0.15 5.2*
Republican People’s Party CHP 1.33 0.18 7.4*
True Path Party DYP — — —
Nationalist Action Party MHP -0.12 0.18 0.66
Young Party GP — — —
People’s Democracy Party HADEP 0.43 0.21 2.0
Motherland Party ANAP -0.31 0.19 1.63
(Normalized with respect to DYP) — — —
Spatial Coefficient β 1.52* 0.12 12.66*
Convergence Coefficient c 5.94* 0.27 22.0*
n = 483
Log marginal likelihood (LML) = −737
*=Significant with probability < 0.001.
Table 2.5
Pure Spatial Model of the Turkish Election 2002
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Comparing Tables 2.4 and 2.5, it is clear that the relative valences of the ANAP
and MHP, under the pure spatial model, dropped between 1999 and 2002. In 1999,
the estimated ΛANAP was +0.336, while the confidence interval on ΛANAP for 1999 in
Table 4 shows that the hypothesis that ΛANAP = 0 should be rejected. In contrast the
estimated value of ΛANAP for 2002 was −0.31, and the confidence interval on ΛANAP
does not allow us to reject the hypothesis that ΛANAP = 0.
25 Similarly ΛMHP fell
from a significant value of +0.666 in 1999 to −0.12 in 2002. The estimated relative
valence, ΛAKP , of the new Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 was +0.78,
in comparison to the valence of the FP of −0.159 in 1999. Since the AKP can be
regarded as a transformed FP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, we
can infer from the confidence intervals on these two relative valences that this was a
significant change due to Erdogan’s leadership.26
It should be noted that the β coefficients for the pure spatial models were 0.375 in
1999, and 1.52 in 2002. Both of these are estimated to be non-zero at the 0.001 level.
Indeed, they are significantly different from each other,27 suggesting that electoral
preferences over policy had become more intense.
We first use the results of the formal pure spatial model given in the Appendix A to
compute estimates of the convergence coefficients. These computations suggest that
convergence to an electoral center is not to be expected in these elections. We then
25These tables show the standard errors of the coefficients, as well as the t-values, the ratios of
the estimated coefficient to the standard error.
26Although Erdogan was the party leader, Abdullah Gul became Prime Minister after the Novem-
ber 2002 election because Erdogan was banned from holding office. Erdogan took over as Prime
Minister after winning a by-election in March 2003.
27The 95% confidence interval for β1999 is [0.2,0.55] and for β2002 it is [1.28,1.76]
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Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Variable Party Est Std Err Lower Bound Upper Bound
Spatial Coeff. β 0.456 0.104 0.243 0.648
Relative Valence Λk ANAP -0.114 0.727 -1.513 1.227
CHP -0.673 0.770 -2.166 0.786
DSP 0.463 0.720 -0.930 1.825
FP 1.015 0.878 -0.709 2.755
HADEP -0.610 1.230 -3.004 1.803
MHP 2.447 0.669 1.167 3.664
Age ANAP 0.001 0.012 -0.021 0.023
CHP -0.009 0.013 -0.033 0.016
DSP -0.008 0.012 -0.031 0.014
FP -0.023 0.014 -0.050 0.003
HADEP -0.053 0.023 -0.103 -0.014
MHP -0.044 0.012 -0.067 -0.022
Education ANAP 0.006 0.065 -0.115 0.130
CHP 0.106 0.063 -0.012 0.232
DSP 0.077 0.058 -0.024 0.197
FP -0.129 0.081 -0.285 0.018
HADEP 0.144 0.097 -0.038 0.335
MHP -0.060 0.061 -0.175 0.070
Kurd ANAP 1.132 0.924 -0.410 3.138
CHP 1.715 0.911 0.194 3.637
DSP -0.102 1.083 -2.650 2.098
FP 1.116 0.972 -0.733 3.024
HADEP 5.898 0.926 4.290 7.904
MHP 0.063 0.933 -1.751 2.148
Soc. Econ. Status ANAP 0.080 0.165 -0.302 0.394
CHP 0.163 0.176 -0.195 0.499
DSP -0.010 0.158 -0.322 0.333
FP 0.120 0.179 -0.230 0.458
HADEP -0.119 0.264 -0.598 0.384
MHP 0.168 0.159 -0.147 0.469
Alevi ANAP -0.697 0.972 -2.687 1.168
CHP 3.089 0.693 1.965 4.715
DSP 0.934 0.729 -0.383 2.423
FP 0.346 0.939 -1.374 2.007
HADEP 1.355 0.972 -0.332 3.605
MHP -0.873 0.925 -3.225 0.676
n=635 Log marginal likelihood = -1178
Table 2.6
Joint Model of the 1999 Election in Turkey
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Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval
Variable Party Est Std Dev Lower Bound Upper Bound
Spatial Coeff β 1.445 0.143 1.180 1.723
Valence Λk AKP 1.968 0.667 0.708 3.432
CHP 1.103 0.797 -0.579 2.615
HADEP 2.596 1.246 -0.254 5.049
MHP 1.714 0.889 -0.021 3.426
ANAP -0.567 0.880 -2.487 1.133
Age AKP -0.031 0.011 -0.052 -0.010
CHP -0.019 0.013 -0.045 0.005
HADEP -0.060 0.024 -0.110 -0.014
MHP -0.067 0.017 -0.103 -0.034
ANAP -0.004 0.014 -0.031 0.022
Education AKP -0.070 0.062 -0.185 0.045
CHP -0.007 0.068 -0.136 0.115
HADEP -0.142 0.108 -0.365 0.079
MHP -0.048 0.079 -0.202 0.106
ANAP -0.078 0.076 -0.237 0.064
Kurd AKP 2.086 1.105 0.203 4.596
CHP 1.251 1.171 -0.891 3.839
HADEP 5.996 1.208 3.960 8.945
MHP 1.595 1.312 -0.960 4.258
ANAP 1.603 1.199 -0.535 4.358
Soc. Econ. Status AKP 0.142 0.160 -0.160 0.457
CHP 0.198 0.191 -0.196 0.560
DEHAP -0.217 0.281 -0.755 0.301
MHP 0.317 0.204 -0.083 0.703
ANAP 0.214 0.209 -0.182 0.613
Alevi AKP -0.249 0.983 -2.125 1.743
CHP 2.567 0.817 1.111 4.489
DEHAP 0.377 1.045 -1.519 2.540
MHP -0.529 1.410 -3.565 2.292
ANAP 1.392 0.931 -0.323 3.560
n=483 Log marginal likelihood = -732
Table 2.7
Joint Model of the 2002 Election in Turkey
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use simulation to determine the LNE of the empirical joint models, again showing
non-convergence. This allows us to obtain information about activist support for the
parties.
2.2.1 The 2002 Election
Figure 2.3 shows the smoothed estimate of the voter ideal points in 2002. This
distribution gives the 2 by 2 voter covariance matrix, with an electoral variance on
the first axis (religion) estimated to be 1.18 while the electoral variance on the second
axis (nationalism) was 1.15. The total electoral variance was σ2 = 2.33, with an
electoral standard deviation of σ = 1.52 The covariance between the two axes was
equal to 0.74.
Thus the voter covariance matrix is
∇0 =
 1.18 0.74
0.74 1.15

with trace(∇0) = 2.33.
The eigenvalues of this matrix are 1.9, with major eigenvector (+1.0,+0.97) and
0.43, with minor eigenvector (−0.97,+1.0). The major eigenvector corresponds to the
principal electoral axis, aligned at approximately 45 degrees to the religion axis.
For the pure spatial model M(Λ,β), the β coefficient was 1.52, The valence terms are
estimated in contrast with the valence of the DYP, and the the party with the lowest
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relative valence is ANAP with ΛANAP = −0.31. By definition, ΛDY P = 0. The vector
of relative valences is then
(ΛANAP ,ΛMHP ,ΛDY P ,ΛHADEP ,ΛAKP ,ΛCHP )
= (−0.31,−0.12, 0.0, 0.43, 0.78, 1.33).
When all parties are at the origin, the probability, ρANAP , that a voter chooses ANAP,
in the model M(Λ,β), is independent of the voter. Appendix A, equation (7), shows
that this is given by
exp(−0.31)
exp(−0.31) + exp(−0.12) + exp(0.0) + exp(0.43) + exp(0.78) + exp(1.33)
= [1 + exp(0.19) + exp(0.31) + exp(0.74) + exp(1.09) + exp(1.164)]−1
= [1 + 1.2 + 1.36 + 2.09 + 2.97 + 3.2]−1
= 0.08.
Below, we show that the 95% confidence interval on ρANAP is [0, 05, 0.11], which
includes the actual vote share (5.13%) in 2002.
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Appendix A shows that the Hessian of the vote share function of ANAP, when all
parties are at the origin, is given by the characteristic matrix of ANAP:
CANAP = 2β(1− 2ρANAP )∇0 − I
= 2× (1.52)× [(1− (2× 0.08)]∇0 − I
= (2.55)
 1.18 0.74
0.74 1.15
− I
=
 2.01 1.88
1.88 1.93
 .
Moreover, the convergence coefficient,
c = 2β(1− 2ρANAP )trace(∇0) = 2.55× 2.33 = 5.94.
This greatly exceeds the upper bound of +2.0 for convergence to the electoral origin.
The major eigenvalue for the ANAP characteristic matrix is +3.85, with eigenvector
(+1.0,+0.98), while the minor eigenvalue is +0.09, with orthogonal, minor eigenvector
(−0.98,+1.0). The eigenvectors of this Hessian are almost perfectly aligned with the
principal and minor components, or axes, of the electoral distribution.
Although the electoral origin satisfies the first order condition for local equilibrium,
it follows from a standard result that the electoral origin is a minimum of the vote
share function of ANAP, when the other parties are at the same position. On both
principal and minor axes, the vote share of ANAP increases as it moves away from
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the electoral origin, but because the major eigenvalue is much larger than the minor
one, we can expect that the AKP (as well the other parties) in equilibrium to adopt
positions along a single eigenvector. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present two LNE obtained
from simulation of the pure spatial model. These are:
z1 =

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel 0.16 −0.69 0.40 −0.50 0.47 0.23
y : nat 0.17 −0.77 0.41 −0.57 0.45 0.26
 .
z2 =

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel 0.17 0.43 −0.65 −0.51 0.47 0.22
y : nat 0.18 0.43 −0.72 −0.56 0.45 0.25
 .
Note that all the positions in these two LNE lie close to the principal axis given
by the eigenvector (1.0, 1.0). The higher valence parties, the AKP and CHP lie closer
to the origin, while the lower valence parties tend to be further from the origin.
In contrast, the estimated positions of the parties for 2002 in Figure 2.2 are:
z∗ =

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel −2.0 0.0 0.0 −2.0 −0.2 1.0
y : nat +0.1 1.5 0.5 −1.5 −0.1 0.1
 .
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Figure 2.4. A Local Nash Equilibrium for the pure spatial model in 2002
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Figure 2.5. A Local Nash Equilibrium for the pure spatial model in 2002
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The equilibrium positions of the CHP and MHP, particularly, are very far from
their estimated positions.
Errors in the models
Appendix A shows that the standard error on ΛANAP is h = 0.19, so
ρANAP (ΛANAP + h) = ρANAP (ΛANAP ) + h
dρAnap
dΛ
= ρANAP (ΛANAP ) + hρANAP (1− ρANAP ).
This gives a standard error of 0.014 and a 95% confidence interval on ρANAP of
[0.05, 0.11]. Since the standard error on β is 0.12, giving a confidence interval on β
of approximately [1.28, 1.76], the standard error on c is 0.27. Using the lower bound
on β and upper bound on ρANAP gives an estimate for the 95% confidence interval
on c of [4.65, 7.38], so we can assert that, with very high probability, the convergence
coefficient exceeds 4.0. Another way of interpreting this observation is that even if we
use the upper estimate of the relative valence for ANAP, and the lower bound on β,
then the joint origin will still be a minimum of the vote share function for ANAP.
We now repeat the analysis for the election of 1999.
2.2.2 The 1999 Election
The empirical model presented in Table 2.4 estimated the electoral variance on
the first axis (religion) to be 1.20 while on the second axis (nationalism) the electoral
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variance, σ2, was 1.14, giving a total electoral variance, σ2, of 2.34, with the covariance
between the two axes equal to +0.78.
The electoral covariance matrix is the 2 by 2 matrix
∇0 =
 1.20 0.78
0.78 1.14
 .
For the model ,the β coefficient was 0.375, while the party with the lowest valence
was FP with ΛFP = −0.16. The vector of valences is:
(ΛFP ,ΛMHP ,ΛDY P ,ΛHADEP ,ΛANAP ,ΛCHP ,ΛDSP )
= (−0.16,+0.66, 0.0,−0.071,+0.34,+0.73,+0.72).
When all parties are located at the origin, the probability, ρFP , that a voter chooses
FP under M(Λ,β) is equal to
1
[1 + exp(0.82) + exp(0.16) + exp(0.09) + exp(0.5) + exp(0.89) + exp(0.88)]
= [11.27]−1 = 0.08.
The standard error on ΛFP is 0.175, so the 95% confidence interval can be estimated
to be [[0.01, 0.15]. The FP vote share in 1999 was 15.41%, suggesting that the pure
spatial model should be extended to include sociodemographic valences.
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Now 2β(1−2ρFP ) = 2β×(1−2×(0.08)) = 2×0.38×0.84 = 0.64, so the characteristic
matrix of the FP is
CFP = (0.64)
 1.20 0.78
0.78 1.14
− I
=
 −0.24 0.448
0.448 −0.27
 .
and c = 0.64× 2.34 = 1.49.
Although c < 2.0, we can compute the eigenvalues of CFP to be −0.74 with minor
eigenvector (+1,−1.116) and +0.23, with major eigenvector (+1,+0.896), giving a
saddle-point for the FP Hessian at the joint origin. As with the 2002 election, on
the basis of the pure spatial model, we again expect all parties to align along the
major eigenvector, at approximately 45 degrees to the religion axis. Note, however,
that the standard error on c is of order 0.22, so unlike the result for the election of
2002, we cannot assert that there is a high probability that the convergence coefficient
exceeds 2. However, there is a probability exceeding 0.95 that one of the eigenvalues
is positive.
In comparing the pure spatial models of the elections of 1999 and 2002, we note
there is very little difference between the model predictions.
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2.2.3 Extension of the model for Turkey
We now use the empirical joint model, M(Λ, θ, β), in order to better model party
positioning. We use this model in order to estimate the influence of party activists in
a more general activist model, denoted M(Λ, µ, β). In the activist model,the activist
functions µ ={µj : j ∈ P} are presumed to be functions of party position, rather than
exogenous constants. The idea behind this model is that activists provide campaign
contributions to specific parties, and these contributions can be used by the parties
to affect valence. For the game theoretic foundations of this model see [Grossman
and Helpman, 1996, Grossman and Helpman, 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 2002].
Grossman and Helpman, 1996 also define two distinct motives for these activists:
“Contributors with an electoral motive intend to promote the electoral prospects of
preferred candidates. Those with an influence motive aim to influence the politicians’
policy pronouncements.”
Here we use a reduced form of the activist functions, based on [Schofield, 2006],
since we only need the fact that the activist contribution to party j is a differentiable
function of the party’s position, and positively affects the parties valence.
Theorem 1 of Appendix A shows that the first order condition for a local equi-
librium, z∗ = (z∗1 , ...z
∗
p), in the activist model is given by the set of gradient balance
conditions :
dE∗j
dzj
(z∗j ) +
1
2β
dµj
dzj
(z∗j ) = 0. (2.1)
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Each term,
dµj
dzj
(zj) is the the marginal activist pull (or gradient) at zj, giving the
marginal activist effects on party j , while the gradient term
dE∗j
dzj
(zj) =
[
zelj − zj
]
is
the gradient electoral pull on the party, at zj, pointing towards its weighted electoral
mean, zelj , as defined for party j in (5) in Appendix A:
zelj ≡
n∑
i=1
$ijxi,where [$ij] =
[
[ρij − ρ2ij]∑
k∈N [ρkj − ρ2kj]
]
. (2.2)
The weighted electoral mean essentially weights voter policy preferences by the degree
to which the sociodemographic valences influence the choice of the voter.
Note in particular that (2) gives the first order condition for any of the various
models considered here. In particular, if the sociodemographic and activist terms are
zero, then (2) reduces to [αij] =
1
n
, and, by the obvious coordinate transformation,
we obtain zj = 0 , for all j, as the first order condition.
The joint model, M(Λ, θ, β), allows us to draw some inferences about equilibrium
positions. First we note that in the joint model, the sociodemographic valences are
substitutes for the relative valences. Table 2.7 shows that the only relative valence
that is significantly non zero in 2002 is ΛAKP . A number of the sociodemographic
valences are, however, very significant. 28
Figures 2.4 gives an LNE, z3, obtained by simulation of the joint model,M(Λ, θ, β) :
28The Bayes factors, or differences between the log marginal likelihoods of the joint models over
the pure spatial models were +5 in both years.
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z3 =

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel 0.12 0.26 0.40 −0.50 −0.58 0.19
y : nat 0.16 0.38 0.41 −0.51 −0.61 0.24
 .
Again the estimated positions are:
z∗ =

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel −2.0 0.0 0.0 −2.0 −0.2 1.0
y : nat +0.1 1.5 0.5 −1.5 −0.1 0.1
 .
Comparing the joint model with the pure spatial model, we see that the equilib-
rium positions are slightly better predictors for HADEP, MHP and ANAP
For this joint model, Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that the sociodemographic valences
for HADEP (or DEHAP) by Kurdish voters were very high:
(θHADEP  ηKurd) = 5.9 in 1999
(θHADEP  ηKurd) = 6.0 in 2002.
Keeping the other variables at their means in 2002, then changing ηKurd from
non-Kurd to Kurd increases the probability of voting for HADEP from 0.013 to 0.45.
The high significance level of the sociodemographic variables indicates that the joint
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electoral model would predict that HADEP would move close to Kurdish voters who
tend to be located on the left of the religion axis, and are also anti-nationalistic. The
position marked HADEP in Figure 2.2 is consistent with this inference.
The joint model also shows that Alevi voters have very high sociodemographic
valences for the CHP, with
(θCHP  ηAlevi) = 3.1 in 1999
(θCHP  ηAlevi) = 2.6 in 2002.
The Alevis are a non-Sunni religious community, who are adherents of Shia Islam
rather than Sunni, and may be viewed as supporters of “Kemalism” or the secular
state. Again, with other variables at their means, changing ηAlevi from non-Alevi to
Alevi increases the probability of voting for CHP in 2002 from 0.16 to 0.63. Thus the
joint model indicates that the CHP will move to a vote maximizing position, on the
left of the religious axis, again as indicated in Figure 2.2.
Conversely, for Alevi voters θAKP  ηAlevi) = −0.25 in 2002, and we can infer that
the AKP may have right to attract Sunni voters.
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In the model M(Λ, θ, β), we do not consider activist terms, so this is equivalent
to setting {dµj
dzj
} = 0. We can infer from (1) that the first order balance condition will
be satisfied at a vector z = (z1, ...zp) when
dE∗j
dzj
≡ [zelj − zj] = 0, for each j.
Thus we can use z1 as the estimator for the vector of weighted electoral means.
We find that
z∗ − z3 = 
Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel −2.0 0.0 0.0 −2.0 −0.2 1.0
y : nat +0.1 1.5 0.5 −1.5 −0.1 0.1

−

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel 0.12 0.26 0.40 −0.50 −0.58 0.19
y : nat 0.16 0.38 0.41 −0.51 −0.61 0.24
 .
=

Party CHP MHP DY P HADEP ANAP AKP
x : rel −3.2 −0.26 −0.40 −1.50 +0.38 0.81
y : nat −0.15 +1.12 0.09 −0.99 +0.51 −0.14

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Assuming that this vector is an LNE with respect to the full model, M(Λ, µ,β)
involving activists, then by (13) in the Appendix A, we can make the identification:
1
2β
[
dµ1
dz1
, ...,
dµp
dzp
]
= z∗ − z3
Here, {dµ1
dz1
, ..., dµp
dzp
} are the marginal activist pulls at the equilibrium vector z∗.
Under the hypothesis that the joint model with activists is valid, then the difference
between these two vectors gives us an estimate of the vector of marginal pulls on the
parties:
The estimated activist pull on HADEP is very high, pulling the party to the left
on the religion axis, and in an anti-nationalist direction on the y axis. Similarly,the
estimated activist pull on the CHP is even higher on the religious axis, pulling the
party in a secular direction, and we can infer that this is due to the influence of Alevi
voters.
As a consequence, this asymmetry will cause Alevi activists to provide further
differential support for the CHP. It is thus plausible that secular voters (on the left
of the religious axis in Figures 2.1 and 2.2) would offer further support to the CHP,
located close to them. This would affect the party’s marginal activist pull, and induce
the CHP leader to move even further left, towards its inferred equilibrium position in
the full activist model.
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We suggest that activist support for the AKP would move it slightly to the right
on the religion axis, as well as in an anti-nationalism direction. This would result in
its estimated position as in Figure 2.2.
In contrast, we might conjecture that the military provides activist support for
the MHP on the nationalism axis, and this will move the party to the left in a secular
direction, and north on the nationalism axis, resulting in its position in Figure 2.2.
Overall, we note that we can expect activist valence to strongly influence party po-
sitioning, and we can proxy this support to some degree using the sociodemographic
variables. Notice that the sociodemographic variables are estimated at the vector z∗,
so the estimated sociodemographic valences have been influenced by activist support.
The LNE obtained from the joint model is a hypothetical solution to the vote max-
imizing game involving the parties, based on some empirical assumptions about the
underlying nature of the important sociodemographic groups in the polity.
2.3 Concluding Remarks
Recent works by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005, Boix, 2003, and Przeworski,
2000 have explored the transition from autocratic regimes to democracy. A recent
contribution by Epstein et al., 2006 has emphasized the existence of the category of
“partial democracies.” These exhibit mixed characteristics of both democratic and
autocratic regimes. In fact, Epstein et al., 2006 give Turkey as a prime illustration of
the possible degree of democratic volatility of a regime. They observe that, in terms
of Polity IV scores, Turkey fell from being a full democracy to an autocracy first in
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the mid 1960’s and again in the early 1980’s, and since then has hovered between
partial and full democracy. [Epstein et al., 2006] also comment, on the basis of their
empirical analysis, that “the determinants of the behavior of partial democracies
elude our understanding.” These models of democratic transitions have tended to
consider a single economic axis, and to utilize the notion of a median citizen, or
median kingmaker as the unique pivotal player.29 While these models have been
illuminating, we believe it necessary to consider policy spaces of higher dimension
and to utilize a stochastic model so as to emphasize the aspect of uncertainty.
The analysis of Turkey in this paper indicates that both religion and nationalism
define the political space.30 The military in Turkey can be represented by a pro-
nationalist position, which is also far from the religiously conservative masses and the
governing party, AKP. It is this very phenomenon which means that Turkish politics
cannot be understood in terms of a median voter. Modeling partial democracies
would seem to require a very explicit analysis of the power of activist groups.
This paper has applied a theoretical stochastic model to present an empirical
analysis of elections in Turkey, and argues that there is no evidence of a centripetal
tendency towards an electoral center. Instead it suggests that activist groups will tend
to be located far from the electoral center. Once the sociodemographic valences have
caused the parties to move away from the center in order to gain electoral support,
the influence of activists will separate the parties even further, pulling them towards
29See Gallego and Pitchik (2004).
30 [Schofield and Sened, 2006] found the electoral model for Israel to be very similar to Turkey,
with two electoral axes, religion and security. [Schofield and Zakharov, 2010] found nationalism to
be one of the principal axes in Russia, but the second axis was defined by attitudes to capitalism/
communism, perhaps comparable to religion.
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policy positions preferred by the activists. Thus simulation of the joint model with
sociodemographic valence can be used to infer aspects of this activist influence.
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2.4 Appendix A: Formal and Empirical Electoral Models
2.4.1 The Model with Activists
The electoral model presented here is an extension of the multiparty stochastic
model of McKelvey and Patty, 2006, modified by inducing asymmetries in terms of
valence. The justification for developing the model in this way is the empirical evi-
dence that valence is a natural way to model the judgements made by voters of party
leaders and candidates. There are a number of possible choices for the appropriate
model for multiparty competition. The simplest one, which we first present, is that
the utility function for leader j is proportional to the popular support, Vj, of the
party in the election.31 With this assumption, we can examine the conditions on the
parameters of the stochastic model which are necessary for the existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE). Because the vote share functions are differentiable,
we use calculus techniques to obtain conditions for positions to be locally optimal.
Thus we examine what we call local pure strategy Nash equilibria (LNE). From the
definitions of these equilibria it follows that a PNE must be a LNE, but not con-
versely. A necessary condition for an LNE is thus a necessary condition for a PNE.
A sufficient condition for an LNE is not a sufficient condition for PNE. Indeed, addi-
tional conditions of concavity or quasi-concavity are required to guarantee existence
of PNE.
31The popular support may be identical to the vote share in a democratic election, or may
be weighted by individual characteristics, such as domicile, income or ownership of land, in non-
democratic polities.
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The stochastic model essentially assumes that candidates cannot predict vote
response precisely, but that they can estimate the effect of policy proposals on the
expected vote share. In the model with valence, the stochastic element is associated
with the weight given by each voter, i, to the average perceived quality or valence of
each candidate. We also consider a formal model where the perceptions of the leader
qualities vary across different sociodemographic groups in the society.
The data of the spatial model is a distribution, {xi ∈ X}i∈N , of voter ideal points
for the members of the electorate, N , of size n. We assume that X is a subset of
Euclidean space, of dimension w with w finite. Without loss of generality, we adopt
coordinate axes so that 1
n
Σxi = 0. By assumption 0 ∈ X, and this point is termed
the electoral mean, or alternatively, the electoral origin. Each of the parties in the
set P = {1, . . . , j, . . . , p} chooses a policy, zj ∈ X, to declare prior to the specific
election to be modeled. Let z = (z1, . . . , zp) ∈ Xp be a typical vector of party policy
positions.
Given z, each citizen, i, is described by a utility vector
ui(xi, z) = (ui1(xi, z1), . . . , uip(xi, zp))
where
uij(xi, zj) = λj + µj(zj)− β||xi − zj||2 + εj. = u∗ij(xi, zj) + εj. (2.3)
Here u∗ij(xi, zj) is the observable component of utility. The constant term, λj,
is the fixed or exogenous valence of party j, The function µj(zj) is the component
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of valence generated by activist contributions to agent j. We can also refer to this
term as endogenous valence. The term β is a positive constant, called the spatial
parameter, giving the importance of policy difference defined in terms of a metric
induced from the Euclidean norm, || · ||, on X. The vector ε = (ε1, . . . , εj, . . . , εp) is
the stochastic error, whose multivariate cumulative distribution will be denoted by
Ψ. The notation λj + µj(zj) is intended to imply that this is the average valence for
party j among the electorate, but the realized valence is a distributed by Ψ. The
most common assumption in empirical analyses is that Ψ is the Type I extreme value
distribution (sometimes called Gumbel). This cumulative distribution has the closed
form
Ψ(x) = exp [− exp [−x]] .
The theorems presented in this appendix are based on this assumption. This distri-
bution assumption is the basis for much empirical work based on multinomial logit
estimation [Dow and Endersby, 2004].
In empirical models, the exogenous valences are simply real numbers, estimated
by the model. Since they are all finite, they can be ranked. We therefore assume that
the exogenous valence vector is given by
λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λp) satisfies λp ≥ λp−1 ≥ · · · ≥ λ2 ≥ λ1.
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This is a strong assumption, in that it assumes that every voter ranks the parties
in this fashion. Adding sociodemographic valences, as in the body of the paper, means
that this ranking over valences differs among the electorate.
Voter behavior is modeled by a probability vector. The probability that a voter i
chooses party j at the vector z is
ρij(z) = Pr[[uij(xi, zj) > uil(xi, zl)], for all l 6= j].
Here Pr stands for the probability operator generated by the distribution assump-
tion on ε.
With this distribution assumption on Ψ, it follows, for each voter i, and leader j,
that
ρij(z) =
exp[u∗ij(xi, zj)]
p∑
k=1
expu∗ik(xi, zk)
. (2.4)
For any voting model the likelihood of a model is
L =
∏
i∈N, ji∈P
ρiji(z),
where ji is the party that i chooses. The log likelihood of the model is loge(L). Clearly
as L approaches 0 then loge(L) approaches − ∞.
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To compare two models, M1 and M2, the Bayes Factor is L(M1)/L(M2) and the
log Bayes factor of M1against M2 is loge(L(M1)− loge(L(M2). A log Bayes factor
over 5.0 for M1 against M2 is considered strong support for M1 (Kass and Raftery,
1995).
The expected popular support for leader j is
Vj(z) ≡
∑
i∈N
sijρij(z).
Here {sij} are different weights that can be associated with different voters. In
the case all weights are equal to 1
n
, we call the model egalitarian.
It is useful to have a formal model where voter weights differ. For example, in
US Presidential elections, it is not the vote share per se but the share of the electoral
college total. Voter weights in different States will therefor vary.
To present the model we now regard V = {Vj : j ∈ P} as a set of vote share
functions, and identify V as a differentiable profile function, V : Xp → Rp. We
denote the egalitarian profile function as Ve.
In this stochastic electoral model, it is assumed that each party j chooses zj to
maximize Vj, conditional on z−j = (z1, . . . , zj−1, zj+1, . . . , zp).
Thus a vector z∗=(z∗1 , . . . , z
∗
j−1, z
∗
j , z
∗
j+1, . . . , z
∗
p) is called a local strict Nash equi-
librium (LSNE) if each zj strictly locally maximizes Vj, conditional on z−j, while z∗
is a local weak Nash equilibrium (LNE) if each zj weakly locally maximizes Vj, condi-
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tional on z−j. The notion of LSNE is convenient so as to avoid degeneracy problems
associated with the Hessians.
In the same way the vector z∗ is a strict (or weak) pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE or PNE) if each party j chooses zj to strictly (or weakly) maximize Vj on X.
Now assume that the vector z is fixed, and let ρij(z) = ρij be the probability that
i picks j. Define the p by n matrix array of weights by
[$ij] ≡
[
sij[ρij − ρ2ij]∑
k∈N skj[ρkj − ρ2kj]
]
(2.5)
The vector
∑
i
$ijxi is a convex combination of the set of voter ideal points and
is called the weighted electoral mean for party j. Define
zelj ≡
n∑
i=1
$ijxi and
dE∗j
dzj
(zj) ≡
[
zelj − zj
]
.
Then the balance equation for z∗j is given by the expression
dE∗j
dzj
(z∗j ) +
1
2β
dµj
dzj
(z∗j ) = 0. (2.6)
The term
dE∗j
dzj
(zj) is the marginal electoral pull of party j at the point zj and can
be regarded as a gradient vector, at zj, pointing towards the weighted electoral mean
of the party. (Note that this electoral pull depends on the positions of all leaders.)
When zj is equal to the weighted electoral mean then the electoral pull is zero. The
gradient vector
dµj
dzj
(zj) is called the marginal activist pull for party j at zj.
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When
dµj
dzj
(zj) = 0, then then the balance equation reduces to setting zj = z
el
j .
If z∗ = (z∗1 , . . . z
∗
j , . . . z
∗
p) is such that each z
∗
j satisfies the balance equation then
call z* a balance solution. The balance solution requires that the electoral and activist
gradients are directly opposed, for every party leader.
The model just presented is denoted M(λ, µ,β; V). [Schofield, 2006] proves the
following theorem for this model.
Theorem 1.
Consider the electoral model M(λ, µ,β; V) based on the distribution, Ψ, including
both exogenous and activist valences, and defined by the family V of vote share
functions.
(i) The first order condition for z∗ to be an LSNE is that it is a balance solution.
(ii) If all activist valence functions are sufficiently concave32, then a balance solu-
tion will be a PNE.
In the full activist model, M(λ, µ,β; V), with valence functions {µj} that are not
identically zero or constant, then it is the case that generically z0 cannot satisfy the
first order conditions for LNE even when V is egalitarian. Instead the vector
dµj
dzj
“points towards” the position at which the activist valence for leader j is maximized.
When this marginal or gradient vector,
dµj
dzj
, is increased (as activist groups become
more willing to contribute to leader j) then the equilibrium position is pulled away
from the weighted electoral mean of the leader, and we can say the “activist effect”
32By this we mean that the eigenvalues of the activist functions are negative and of sufficient
magnitude everywhere. That is to say, there exists α < 0, such that all eigenvalues < α is sufficient
to guarantee existence of a PNE.
50
for the leader is increased. In the case of two opposed leaders, j and k, if the activist
valence functions are fixed, but the exogenous valence, λj, is increased, or λk, is
decreased, then the weighted electoral mean, zelj , approaches the electoral origin.
Thus the local equilibrium of leader j is pulled towards the electoral origin. We can
say the “electoral effect” is increased.
2.4.2 The Egalitarian Model without Activists
In the case that the activist valence functions are identically zero, or constant,
we denote the model by M(λ,β; V).The key consideration for the egalitarian model,
M(λ,β; Ve),when all voter weights are identical, is whether the electoral origin is a
LSNE. For this model it can be shown that if all parties are at the same position, so
z∗= (z∗, z∗, ...z∗) then every {ρij(z∗) : i ∈ N} is independent of i, and can thus be
written ρj(z
∗). This implies that all αij in (5) are identical at z∗ and equal to 1n . Thus,
when there is only exogenous valence, the equation z∗j =
1
n
Σxi satisfies the balance
solution for all j. By an appropriate coordinate change, we can assume 1
n
Σxi = 0.
In this case, all marginal electoral pulls are zero at z0 = (0, ...0), so z0 satisfies the
first order conditions. However, to determine whether z0 is an LNE it is necessary to
examine the Hessians of the vote share functions.
We first define the electoral covariance matrix, ∇0, and then use ∇0 to de-
fine the convergence coefficient of the model M(λ,β; Ve). Let X = Rw be en-
dowed with a system of coordinate axes r = 1, . . . , w. For each coordinate axis
let ξr = (x1r, x2r, . . . , xnr) be the vector of the r
th coordinates of the set of n voter
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ideal points. The scalar product of ξr and ξs is denoted (ξr ξs). Let (σr σs) = 1n(ξr ξs)
be the electoral covariance between the rth and sth axes, and σ2s be the variance on
the sth axis.
(i) The symmetric w×w electoral covariance matrix about the origin is denoted ∇0
and is defined by
∇0 ≡ [(σr  σs)]r=1,...,ws=1,...,w .
(ii) The total electoral variance is σ2 ≡∑ws=1 σ2s = trace(∇0).
(iii) At the vector z0 = (0, . . . , 0) the probability ρij(z0) that i votes for party j is
independent of i, and is given by
ρj =
[
1 +
∑
k 6=j
exp [λk − λj]
]−1
. (2.7)
(iv) The Hessian of the egalitarian vote share function of party j at z0 is a positive
multiple of the w by w characteristic matrix,
Cj ≡ 2β(1− 2ρj)∇0 − I. (2.8)
(Here I is the identity matrix.)
The convergence coefficient of the egalitarian model, M(λ,β; Ve), is defined to be
c ≡ c(λ,β; Ve) ≡ 2β[1− 2ρ1]σ2. (2.9)
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Theorem 2.
Consider the electoral model M(λ,β; Ve) where all activist valence functions are
zero (or constant) and Ve is the egalitarian party profile.
(i) The joint origin z0 = (0, . . . , 0) satisfies the first order condition to be a LSNE
for this model.
(ii) In the case that X is w dimensional then the necessary condition for z0 to be
a LNE for this model is that c(λ,β; Ve) ≤ w.
(iii) In the case that X is 2 dimensional, a sufficient condition for z0 to be a LSNE
for this model is that c(λ,β; Ve) < 1.
The proof and some applications of Theorem 2 are given in [Schofield, 2007].
2.4.3 Empirical Models
In empirical models with exogenous valence alone it is necessary to estimate the
model with respect to the valence of a baseline party, say k∗. We set Λj = λj − λk∗ ,
and call these the relative valences. We denote this egalitarian model by M(Λ, β; Ve).
At the joint origin,z0, we see that
ρij(z0) =
exp(λj)
p∑
k=1
exp(λk)
=
exp(λj − λk∗)
p∑
k=1
exp(λk − λk∗)
=
exp(Λj)
p∑
k=1
exp(Λk)
(2.10)
is again independent of the individual, i, and can be written as ρj.
To estimate the standard error on ρj, we use Taylor’s Theorem, which asserts that
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ρj(Λj + h) = ρj(Λj) + h
dρj
dΛj
= ρj(Λj) + hρj(1− ρj). (2.11)
2.4.4 Empirical Models with Sociodemographic Valences
As described in the body of the paper, in empirical applications with sociode-
mographic variables , we typically assume that V is the egalitarian party profile
function,Ve, so the model M(Λ, θ, β; Ve) is based on the assumption that voter util-
ity has the form
uij(xi, zj) = Λj + (θj  ηi)− β‖xi − zj‖2 + εj.
The estimate of voter i′s valence will then be Λj+(θj ηi), so this will vary from one
voter to another. A consequence of this is that, in the expression 2.5 for the weighted
electoral mean, even when all parties are at the origin, then the denominator term
{ρkj(z0) : k ∈ N} will depend on voter k. This implies that voters will be weighted
differently, and generically, z0 will not satisfy the first order condition for LNE. How-
ever, the joint empirical model, M(Λ, θ, β; Ve), assumes that the sociodemographic
effects are independent of party positions, and this implies
dµj
dzj
= 0,for all j. Using (6),
we infer that the various LNE obtained by simulation of the joint model provides an
estimate of a set of vectors of weighted electoral means: {zel = (zel1 , ..., zelp )}.
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Assuming that the estimated party positions are given by the vector z∗ = (z∗1 , .., z
∗
p)
and that this is in equilibrium with respect to the full activist model, then choosing
one joint LNE, zel, gives an estimate of
[
zelj − z∗j
] ≡ dE∗j
dzj
(z∗j ) = −
1
2β
[
dµj
dzj
]
. (2.12)
Thus
[
z∗ − zel] = 1
2β
[
dµ1
dz1
, ...,
dµp
dzp
]
. (2.13)
This observation suggests how the gradients of the activist valence functions may
be inferred from a comparison of LNE of the joint empirical model with the estimated
political configuration.
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2.5 Appendix B: Estimation and Simulation Details
A Bayesian procedure is employed for the estimation of the model. In the Bayesian
approach, rather than treating model parameters as fixed, we treat them as unknown
and try to find a distribution for the model parameters using Bayes rule:
pi(ψ|y) = f(y|ψ)pi(ψ)
f(y)
(2.14)
The left side is the distribution of ψ after observing the data, so called the posterior
distribution. f(y|ψ) is the likelihood function, the density function for the observed
data y given the parameter values ψ. pi(ψ) represents our belief about the distribution
of ψ before observing the data and called the prior distribution. The term in the de-
nominator normalizes the posterior and does not depend on ψ, f(y) =
∫
f(y|ψ)pi(ψ).
That is why the posterior distribution is often stated in terms of proportionality:
pi(ψ|y) ∝ f(y|ψ)pi(ψ) (2.15)
However a posterior function obtained in this form is a high-dimensional object which
is hardly informative about the parameters. For any practical purpose, we would want
to know the marginal distributions of the parameters and possibly report the moments
such as the posterior mean and posterior standard deviation. The rich set of MCMC
simulation techniques are well suited for this task.
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The first step is to choose a prior distribution for the model parameters, ψ. For
our case we assess a multivariate Normal prior:
ψ ∼ N(ψ0,Ψ0)
The likelihood function is then:
f(y|ψ) =
n∏
i=1
ρi,j
=
n∏
i=1
exp[uij(xi, zj)]∑p
l=1 exp[uij(xi, zl)]
(2.16)
It has been stated that the asymptotic normal approximation is excellent for the
multinomial logit likelihood in this form [Rossi et al., 2005]. Hence the posterior
distribution becomes
pi(ψ|y) ∝ |H| 12 exp{1
2
(ψ − ψˆ)′H(ψ − ψˆ)} (2.17)
ψˆ is chosen to be the maximum likelihood estimator for ψˆ and H is chosen to be
minus the Hessian of the likelihood evaluated at ψˆ.
MCMC algorithms approximates the posterior distribution of the parameters by
simulating from it. The Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm is a general principle for
this purpose. Independence MH is a special case of the MH algorithm. Without going
into the details about why and how the MH algorithm work, we will summarize the
independence MH algorithm here. Suppose we want to sample from the distribution
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f(X)33, where X can be scalar or vector random variable. Then the independence
MH algorithm works as follows:
1. Choose a starting value for the parameters to be estimated, x.
2. Generate Y from q(Y).
3. Generate U from U(0, 1) — the uniform distribution. If
U ≤ min
{
f(Y )q(Y )
f(x)g(x)
, 1
}
,
return Y. Otherwise, return x and go to 2.
The distribution q(.) is called the proposal density. The choice of the proposal density
is “often a matter of judgement” [Greenberg, 2008]. However one thing to be careful
about choosing a proposal density is that the “acceptance probability” should be
reasonable. Again following Greenberg, 2008, we have chosen a fat-tailed candidate
distribution, the multivariate student. The candidate vectors were drawn using ψ ∝
MSt(ν, ψˆ,H−1) where ψˆ is the maximum likelihood estimator for ψ, H−1 is the sample
information matrix (minus the actual Hessian of the likelihood evaluated at ψˆ) and
ν is the tuning parameter which is chosen to be 6 for our case.34
The simulation described here is implemented via the rmnlIndepMetrop function in
the bayesm package35 written for the statistical software R.
33So in our case this is the posterior distribution given by 2.17
34This is chosen in the range (5-15) suggested by Rossi et al., 2005
35http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/peter.rossi/research/bsm.html
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3. A Stochastic Model of Clientelistic Linkage as Valence
Buying
3.1 Introduction
There is a revival in the comparative politics literature in an examination of “ma-
chine politics.” Political parties can attempt to affect electoral outcomes by target-
ing benefits to important constituencies and monitoring elections, either in the vote
choice or turnout. This reveals a rich dynamic between policy choice and vote choice.
Recently, scholars have constructed formal models of this type of clienteslistic link-
age, clearly laying out the assumptions of the underlying mechanisms and generating
comparative statics that greatly enhance our understanding of machine politics.
In this paper I do two things. First I build upon this recent wave of formal
models, specifically building upon the models of [Stokes, 2005] and [Nichter, 2008].
The heart of my model relaxes an information assumption used in both models, and
replaces it with what I argue is a more realistic assumption of monitoring by the
“machine.” Loosening this assumption not only changes the individual comparative
statics of these models, it allows for a deeper integration of both models, showing the
conditions under which the ability to monitory and the level of awards available to
the machine can affect vote buying or turnout buying.
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The key insight of this first model is that both [Stokes, 2005] and [Nichter, 2008]
make the assumption the machine has a perfect ability to observe votes cast in favor
of the machine, yet uncertainty about the votes cast against the machine. While this
may seem like a minor assumption, I argue that not only is it unrealistic, it has major
implications for the models. By loosening this assumption I document changes in the
comparative statics of the results, but the implications are broader than a revision of
these two papers.
My main finding shows that, contra Stokes, there is a much wider change of
voters that can be bought by the machine. While Stokes argues that the machine will
target weakly opposed voters, my model shows that under some conditions, a much
wider range of voters can be influenced to vote for the machine. Yet this information
assumption does not dramatically change Nichter’s results on vote turnout.
A second important implication is that the ability to directly monitor either vote
choice or turnout has different effects on machines given this loosened assumption.
Counter-intuitively, an increase in the ability of a machine to monitor an individual
actions may not increase vote buying in [Stokes, 2005] model, but it does increase
vote buying in [Nichter, 2008] turnout model.
Our third, and perhaps most striking result, is that an increase in the rewards
(resources) of the machine may not effect the probability of the machine to buy votes
in either model. A machine with an imperfect ability to distinguish between voters
who will cast their votes for the machine party, and those who will vote against, may
be insensitive to the amount of potential rewards they can offer voters.
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This last results could be especially important for comparative politics scholars
exploring the relationship between natural resource rents and incumbency advantage.
Countries with resource rich political machines may have an inability to use these
resources to increase votes for the machine.
The second part of the paper introduces an alternative way of modeling the clien-
telistic linkage based on the models of spatial voting. Building upon a similar setup
originally developed in [Schofield, 2004], I model the materialistic benefits distributed
by the political parties as serving the purpose of increasing the valence of the party
in the eyes of the receiver of the benefit. The policy choice of the political parties and
their decision regarding to whom to bribe and how much are simultaneously deter-
mined in the equilibrium subject to their resource constraints. This approach opens
the way to many interesting comparative statics which have implications outside the
vote-buying literature, such as the controversial subject of bribing in international
organizations. [Kuziemko and Werker, 2006]
3.2 The Literature
Since the 1950s, political science literature has been dominated by the “responsible
party government” model. This is true both for rational choice theories starting with
Downs, 1957 and for comparative approaches going back to Rokkan and Lipset, 1967.
Although this model captures many dimensions in which parties’ programs reflect
the preferences of the voters, it ignores a quite a different type of party-voter linkage
which exists even in the advanced industrial democracies: the clientelistic linkage.
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In almost all such countries, this voter-party linkage is established through direct
material benefits transferred to voters who trade their votes for a price. There is a
wide variety among the clientelistic linkages in terms of the goods delivered by the
machine parties. In many countries these are one shot consumable goods which can
include money, clothes, food, liquor or coal [Callahan and McCargo, 1996]. In this
sense “clientelistic accountability represents a transaction, the direct exchange of a
citizens vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods,
and services.” [Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a]
In one of the earlier comparative studies Scott, 1972 provides a framework to
examine the embeddedness of the clientelistic linkage in different types of regimes.
The existence of policy-based competition shifts clientelistic linkages from local net-
works to a national level of hierarchical political machines [Scott, 1969]. So in a more
democratic environment clientelism turns into a broker-mediated relationship rather
than a face-to-face exchange [Weingrod, 1968]. The different faces of clientelism in
different regime types and electoral systems is still an under-studied phenomenon.
Since the exchange between the patron and the client is not simultaneous, one
important challenge in the clientelism literature is to account for the opportunistic
defections of the voter. Why would not the voter just take the material benefit and
votes for who ever he wants? One answer to this question is the parties monitoring
the voter behavior. This is often difficult but without it, politicians run the risk of
misdirecting the resources to voters those who will take the money and run. The
simplest way to monitor individual voters is by violating the secrecy of the ballot
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[Whyte, 1965] or giving voters the impression that this is the case [Chandra, 2007].
The monitoring can take the form of self-enforcing group equilibrium through ongoing
network of social relations [Auyero, 1999]. This is an iterative process where all
past behaviors generate an obligation for both the patrons and clients. Whatever
the monitoring mechanism is, neither patrons nor clients are willing to describe the
clientelistic relationship as a simple exchange of desirable goods, but instead interpret
it in more innocent terms as an enactment of community relations and civic solidarity
[Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a].
Another important question in the clientelism literature is related to the types
of voters targeted. One approach is based on the diminishing marginal utility of
income and argues that the benefits will generate more voters with the same amount
of budget if poor voters are targeted [Calvo and Murillo, 2004]. According to Cox and
McCubbins, 1986, on the other hand, the crucial feature of the clientelistic linkage
is that the party is more confident about how the core supporters will respond to
rewards hence will target them. But if these voters are already ideologically attached
to the party, why not target those who are not? Following this question Stokes, 2005
argues that the machine parties will target the ”weakly opposed” voters. That is
they will use their resources to buy the votes which are the cheapest in the sense that
these voters need the smallest amount of reward to change sides.
The greatest obstacle in front of the studies on clientelism is the lack of compar-
ative and historical data. There are many reasons for both voters and politicians
to hide information in this context: to avoid prosecution, to avoid shame as well as
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to deter competitors [Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007b]. This problem is particularly
severe for studies trying to provide a comparative perspective of linkage mechanisms
in order to provide an explanation for the variation in different institutional contexts.
Even studies which conduct small scale case studies have mentioned the difficulty of
proving the existence of clientelism [Auyero, 1999]. Moreover the differences existing
in the nature of the targeted goods and in the survey responses deepens the problems
with the cross-country studies of clientelism.
3.3 The Iterative Model of Vote Buying
In a very influential paper, Stokes presents a formal model of machine politics
based on a repeated game dynamic [Stokes, 2005]. The model is one of imperfect
monitoring. The machine has a limited capability of observing the votes and rewards
the voters depending on whether it thinks the voter voted for it or not. There are
two parts of the voter’s utility, the disutility caused by the ideological distance in
a one dimensional policy space between himself and whom he voted for, and the
materialistic benefit he receives from the machine if he gets any. The machine has a
single opponent. I will mainly follow the notation introduced in that paper.
Let the ideological position of the voter in a one dimensional policy space be
represented by xi, the ideological position of the machine be represented by x1, the
ideological position of the opposition party by x2, the midpoint between the parties
by x∗ = x1+x2
2
and without loss of generality, let x1 < x2. Then the utility of a voter
i is given by
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ui = −1
2
(vi − xi) + bi
where vi = {x1, x2} represents a vote for either the machine or the opposition and
bi = {0, b} represents the value to the voter of the reward offered by the machine.
In addition, let d1 and d2 be the measures of the distances between voter i and the
parties, namely, let d1 = (xi − x1)2/2 and d2 = (xi − x2)2/2. One difference between
my notation and Stokes’s notation is that Stokes uses β for the discount factor and
where as I use δ.
Next I define three different information environments applicable to our setting.
Let c represent the event in which the machine receives a Comply signal —a vote
for itself—and d represent the event in which the machine receives a Defect sig-
nal —a voter for the opposition party—. Let C and D represent the associated
actual actions of the voter. The first information environment is the perfect in-
formation environment, namely the one in which the machine perfectly observes a
compliance and a defection. In terms of conditional probability, we can write this
as: p(c|C) = p(d|D) = 1; p(d|C) = p(c|D) = 0. The second environment is a
semi-perfect (or semi-imperfect in that matter) information environment, namely the
one in which the machine observes a compliance without error where as a defec-
tion is correctly observed with probability p. The conditional probability represen-
tation for this will be p(c|C) = 1; p(d|C) = 0; p(d|D) = p; (c|D) = (1 − p). The
third environment is an imperfect information environment in which the machine
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observes both compliance and defection with a certain probability. For simplicity
we will assume that the probability of observing a vote correctly is the same for
votes which are for the machine and against the machine. In other words we have
p(c|C) = p(d|D) = p; p(d|C) = p(c|D) = (1 − p). Let Io, I1 and I2 represent these
information environments respectively.
The main theoretical finding in Stokes, 2005 on which all comparative statics is
based on is the following:
..., the set of voters who would sell their votes in exchange for a private
benefit is the set whose ideal point, xi, satisfies
x∗ ≤ xi ≤ x∗ + λ(b/x2 − x1)
where λ = pβ
(1−β+pβ) . Stokes uses I0 in some parts of the model and I1 in other parts.
The main argument of this part of the paper is that we should use I2 for the whole
model. This changes the stage game and this in turn changes the comparative statics
results. I also show that similar critiques are applicable to a more recent paper by
Nichter [Nichter, 2008] who uses the same modeling approach but frames the issue as
a “turnout buying” problem rather than “vote buying”.
66
The model starts with a one-shot game in which parties can perfectly observe
individual votes, i.e starts with the I0 environment. The basic argument is that the
voter who gets a reward b from the machine will vote for the machine if and only if
b− (xi − x1)2/2 ≥ −(xi − x2)2/2
or equivalently
xi ≤ x∗ + (b/(x2 − x1)
The voters with x∗ < xi < x∗+ b/(x2− x1) are referred as Weakly opposed and if the
value of the vote to the machine, v, exceeds b, the machine and the weakly opposed
voter are in a prisoner’s dilemma with the following normal form: 1
Reward No Reward
Comply −(xi, x1)2/2 + b, v − b −(xi, x1)2/2, v
Defect −(xi, x2)2/2 + b,−b −(xi, x2)2/2, 0
The model then proceeds to the repeated interaction and starts using the I1 en-
vironment. For this reason, in fact, the stage game is not a normal form repeated
prisoner’s dilemma game but an extensive form game given in Figure 3.1.2 Next, the
condition under which the grim-trigger strategy pair constitutes an equilibrium given
1One conclusion is that x∗ < xi part of the inequality from the observation that voters whose
ideal points are closer to the machine are going to vote for the machine without a reward anyway.
2Using the normal form stage game instead of the one given in Figure 3.1 changes the first period
payoff of the voter when he is caught.
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in equation 3.3 and comparative statics from that equation are derived. There are
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Figure 3.1. The stage game in Stokes’s model
The stage game in Stokes’s model. (V:Voter, N:Nature, M:Machine)
three main comparative statics derived from this model:
• The machine is most effective when it targets weakly opposed voters.
• The more accurately the machine can monitor voters, (an increase in p) the
greater the potential for vote buying.
• As the value of the reward relative to the value of voting in accordance to one’s
policy preference increases the potential for vote buying increases.
To stress it once more, by using the I1 assumption, we are assuming that the machine
can observe a compliance action correctly with probability 1 but observes a defection
correctly with probability p. I argue that there is no justification for this. Why should
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there be a difference in how good a machine observes a vote depending on whether the
vote is for the machine or against it? After all it is the vote that the machine observes
and the information imperfection should apply to all votes, whether it is a vote for
the machine or against it. In none of the empirical studies which focus on monitoring
individual votes support for such a distinction is found [Whyte, 1965, Callahan and
McCargo, 1996].
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Figure 3.2. The stage game under I2 assumption
The stage game under I2 assumption. (V:Voter, N:Nature, M:Machine)
In the rest of this paper I will relax this assumption and resolve the model using the
I2 environment assumption throughout the model. Note that the stage game of the
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repeated dynamic will now be given by Figure 3.2. I will show that the comparative
statics results Stokes finds do not follow. I will also discuss the similar issue in a more
recent paper by Nichter who uses the same model to model turnout buying rather
than vote buying and illustrate the differences I2 environment creates in that setting.
3.3.1 Resolving the Vote Buying Model Under Imperfect Information
I start by solving the benchmark one-shot model solved under the I0 assumption
using the I2 assumption this time. In this case the condition under which the voter
will vote for the machine will be:
p(b− d1) + (1− p)(−d1) ≥ p(−d2) + (1− p)(b− d2)
or
p ≥ d1 − d2 + b
2b
Substituting for d1 and d2 gives us
xi <
2b− 4p2 + x21 − x22
2(x1 − x2)
Depending on the values of the parameters, the right hand side of this inequality can
even be greater than x2.
3 Hence this one-shot benchmark condition does not gives us
information about the voters the machine will target under I2 assumption.
3Namely when b < 1
2(4p2−x21+2x1x2−x22) and p >
1
2(x2−x1)
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Before I solve the repeated game model under I2 assumption, let me summarize
the basic theory behind it. I start with stating one of the most powerful results of
the theory of repeated games.
Proposition 1 (One-deviation property) A strategy profile in an infinitely repeated
game with a discount factor δ less than 1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only
if no player can increase his payoff by changing his action at the start of any subgame
in which he is the first-mover, given the other players’ strategies and the rest of his
strategy. [Osborne, 2004]
Hence to be able to find the equilibrium conditions for a given pair of strategies using
the one-deviation property, we have to compare two utilities for each subgame and
for each player: the utility the player gets from adhering to his strategy given that
the other player adheres to his strategy, and the utility the player gets by deviating
for one period and then sticking to his strategy given the other player sticks to his
strategy. The conditions under which the first utility is greater than the second one
will give us the equilibrium condition. Since an infinitely repeated game has an infinite
number of sub-games, we have to identify the partition of sub-games which yield the
same equilibrium conditions for our choice of strategy pairs. In our case, for the
grim-trigger type strategies there are two classes of sub-games: sub-games following
the initial history or a history consisting of (Comply,Reward) in each period and
any other subgame. We will look at sub-games of first type for the voter since it will
yield the comparative statics we need. The utility from sticking to a grim-trigger type
strategy will differ in the case where the machine also imperfectly monitors a vote
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for itself. There is always a chance that a voter is erroneously “caught” as a defector
even if he has voted for the machine. This can happen at any period. Hence the total
utility from sticking to your strategy will be an infinite sum which includes all such
possibilities, namely, being“caught” in period 1, in period 2 and so on. If the voter
is “caught” in period 1, the utility from sticking to his strategy will be
u1 = (1− p)(−d1 − d2δ − d2δ2...) = −(1− p)(d1 − δd2
1− δ )
Similarly, being caught in later periods yield different payoffs.
Period 2:
u2 = p(1− p)[(b− d1)− d1δ − d2δ2 − d2δ3...)
Period 3:
u3 = p
2(1− p)[(b− d1) + (b− d1)δ − d1δ2 − d2δ3 − d2δ4...)
So the general form of these payoffs for periods n ≥ 2 is
un = p
n(1− p)[(b− d1)(1 + δ + δ2 + ...δn−2)− d1δn−1 − d2(δn + δn+1 + ...)]
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Hence the total payoff from adhering to the GT-type strategy is given by
u =
∞∑
n=1
[
pn(1− p)[(b− d1)(1 + δ + δ2 + ...+ δn−1)− d1δn − d2(δn+1 + δn+2...)
]
+ u1
= (1− p)
∞∑
n=1
[
pn[b(1 + δ + δ2 + ...+ δn−1)− d1(1 + δ + δ2 + ...+ δn)− d2δn+1(1 + δ + δ2...)]
]
+ u1
= (1− p)
∞∑
n=1
pn
[
b
1− δn
1− δ − d1
1− δn+1
1− δ − d2
δn+1
1− δ
]
+ u1
=
(1− p)
(1− δ)
[
b
∞∑
n=1
pn(1− δn)− d1
∞∑
n=1
pn(1− δn+1)− d2δ
∞∑
n=1
(pδ)n
]
+ u1
=
(1− p)
(1− δ)
[[ ∞∑
n=1
pn
]
(b− d1)−
[ ∞∑
n=1
(pδ)n
]
(b− δd1 + δd2)
]
+ u1
=
(1− p)
(1− δ)
[
b− d1
1− p −
(b+ δd2 − δd1)
1− pδ
]
− (1− p)(d1 − δyd21− δ )
= −
(
b(p− pδ)− d2(−1 + p)δ(−2 + pδ)− d1p
(
1− (−2 + p)δ + (−1 + p)δ2)
(−1 + δ)(−1 + pδ)
)
(3.1)
If the voter deviates for one period, there are two possibilities, with probability p he
will be caught and gets a payoff −d2 forever or with probability 1 − p he can avoid
detection and get b− d2 in the first period and get a continuation payoff of u. Thus
the expected payoff from a single deviation will be given by
u′ = p(−d2 − δd2 − δ2d2...) + (1− p)[(b− d2) + δu]
=
−pd2
1− δ + (1− p)[(b− d2) + δu] (3.2)
73
Hence the equilibrium condition is
u ≥ u′
−
(
b(p− pδ)− d2(−1 + p)δ(−2 + pδ)− d1p (1− (−2 + p)δ + (−1 + p)δ2)
(−1 + δ)(−1 + pδ)
)
≥ −pd2
1− δ + (1− p)[(b− d2) + δu] (3.3)
A series of algebraic manipulation and substituting for u gives us this condition
as
K ≥ 0
where K is
(b(−1−2p(−1+δ)+δ)+(1+(−1+p)δ)(d2(1+p2δ2−pδ(1+δ))+d1(2(−1+δ)+p2(−1+δ)δ−p(−1+2δ+δ2))))
(−1+δ)(−1+pδ)
Although this expression is complicated we can still find the comparative statics
we are interested in. We will now compare the four comparative statics derived from
these two models.
1. Targeting
We know that the machine is not going to target the voters who will vote for the
machine even if they receive no reward, i.e, those voters with an ideal position
in the interval x∗ ≥ xi. The more interesting question is about the upper bound
of the ideal positions of the voters whom the machine targets. As it is stated
earlier, this upper bound was found to be x∗+ bpδ
(x2−x1)(1−δ+pδ) in Stokes’s model.
74
In our model, on the other hand, if p is sufficiently low and δ is sufficiently
high, the machine can even target voters with ideal points xi > x2
4. So there is
significant difference between these two models in this respect. The conditions
for this result are complicated. However this is not important because for us
the important part is to show the possible existence of vote buying for different
types of voters rather than the exact form of the bounds of these inequality
conditions.
2. Monitoring
One of the findings of Stokes’s model is that the higher the ability of the machine
of observing votes, the greater the potential for vote buying. In our model, this
is not immediately clear. Depending on the values of other variables an increase
in p might not increase the potential of vote buying.5
3. Reward Value
As I stated earlier, according to Stokes’s model, as the value of the reward
relative to the value of voting in accordance to one’s policy preference increases
the potential for vote buying increases. In my model, on the other hand, it
depends on the value of p. A higher reward makes the vote buying equilibrium
more likely if and only if p > 1
2
. In other words increasing the reward does not
help the machine if it cannot observe the votes with at least 1/2 probability.
4Namely when 2 − √3 > p and δ > (−2 + 3p + p2)/(4(−1 + p)p) −
1/4
√
(4− 20p+ 21p2 − 2p3 + p4)/((−1 + p)2p2)
5One such example is when the discount factor is in a particular interval and the reward is
sufficiently small. The exact cases and conditions are too complicated to present here. See the
attached Mathematica output.
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Moreover, the effect of an increase in the reward on the likelihood of vote buying
increases with p. To put it in another way, the higher the p is the higher the
effect of an increase in the reward will be.
3.3.2 The Case of Turnout Buying
In a more recent paper [Nichter, 2008] an alternative explanation for the same
question is asked: “with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting
rewards and then voting as they wish ?”. He uses the same modeling approach but
focuses on turnout buying rather than vote buying. We will use the same notation
for this model.
The basic idea is that the machine will target those voters who will vote for the ma-
chine if they do, but may not vote due to a voting cost, c. The payoffs in this case is
given by the following matrix6:
Reward No Reward
Comply −(xi − x1)2/2 + b− c, v − b −(xi − x1)2/2− c, v
Defect b,−b 0, 0
The same critique about the form of the stage game and about the assumptions
about the informational environment apply to this study as well. The only thing that
changes is what compliance and defection refers to in the definitions of I0, I1 and
6Note that my claim about this normal form game not being the stage game of the repeated
dynamic applies for this case as well.
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I2. Compliance in this study refers to “Vote” and defection refers to “Not Vote”.
Similar to Stokes, Nichter assumes the I1 information environment implicitly, i.e, he
assumes that the machine can observe the ones who show up at the polls perfectly
where as it might make mistakes while deciding about the ones who don’t show up. If
we resolve Nichter’s model by relaxing the “semi-imperfect” environment assumption
the equilibrium condition we have is7
u− (1− p)b
(1− (1− p)δ) ≥ 0
where u is the expected payoff from adhering to grim-trigger strategy and is equal to
u =
(1− p)
(1− δ)
(
b− d1 − c
(1− p) −
b+ δd1 + cδ
1− pδ − (c+ d1)(1− δ)
)
Next I do the same comparative statics comparison for this model.
1. Targeting
Nichter’s model predicts that machines will target immobilized supporters. The
turnout model under I2 assumption makes a more clean prediction in the same
direction: the machine will target voters with xi < x1.
2. Monitoring
The adjusted model and Nichter’s model yields the same result in this case,
7I am not presenting the calculations here since they are basically the same as the model above.
The only difference is in the functional form of the payoffs.
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the higher the observing ability of the machine, p, the more likely the turnout
buying will take place.
3. Reward Value
Similar to Stokes’s model, Nichter’s model predicts that turnout buying will
become more probable if the reward gets higher. Our adjusted model on the
other hand concludes that an increase in the reward will increase the chances
of turnout buying if an only if p > 1/2. Furthermore, the effect of an increase
in the reward on the likelihood of vote buying increases with p.
3.4 The Spatial Model of Valence Buying
In this section we introduce a spatial model of clientelism. The approach uses a
latent utility based stochastic voting model and utilizes the concept of “valence” in
order to capture the benefit the parties receive from rewarding the voters. So in terms
of explaining the mechanism underlying the clientelistic linkage —why would not
voters just take the money and run question—the argument is quite straightforward:
the materialistic benefits distributed by the political agents—let these be parties or
candidates—is one way of increasing their valences. Although less sophisticated, I
argue that this is quite a natural setup.
In contrast to regular spatial voting models, there are two decision variables which
the parties are trying to choose: a policy position and an allocation vector which
specifies which voters to reward and how much. These two decisions are made simul-
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taneously and this opens the way to many interesting comparative statics as we will
discuss below in mor detail. Also in contrast to the clientelistic politics literature, we
argue that bribing is not always limited to a single machine party the mode presented
will allow each party to reward the voters8. Moreover, we will introduce constraints
on the amount of resources available parties, possibly different from each other. By
doing this we will able to introduce an interesting variation to the problem: different
levels of resources available to different parties.
The concept of valence has been used to explain the non-convergence of policy
positions of the parties. A rather recent stream of works by Norman Schofield and
his coauthors [Miller and Schofield, 2003], [Schofield and Sened, 2006], [Schofield et al.,
2009], [Schofield et al., 2011] are in this very direction. In the model underlying these
papers however, valence is exogenous, i.e, it is not something that the political agents
make a decision on. It is rather what is not explained by other components of the
voter utility function. In the present model, the valences are the rewards given by the
parties to the voters. Our model will be an extension of the setup originally developed
in [Schofield, 2003].
One recent work which studies the “valence buying” problem is Ashworth and
Bueno de Mesquita, 2009. Their setup is however very different than ours. Even if the
level of the valence is a decision variable for the party, it is constant for all individuals.
So their setup does not capture the individual level vote buying phenomenon hence
8Serdar Denktas, the leader of one of the two major parties in Northern Cyprus, had made
the following statement after losing the elections in 2007: “The bargaining for votes started from
350 TL but then dropped. I bought votes 75 TL per voter. The other parties had more money,
so they bought those votes which we could not have.” (Turkish newspaper article available at
http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?t=27.04.2009&c=2&i=183054. Accessed on Aug 04 2012.)
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do not address the main question we are interested in: “Which voters will be targeted
and how much?”.
3.4.1 The Model
Let N be the set of the electorate of size n and P be the set of political parties
of size p. The voters are characterized by their ideal points, {xi ∈ X}i∈N , and the
parties are characterized by their policy positions, {zj ∈ X}i∈P , where X is a compact
convex subset of Euclidean space, R2.
The utility of voter i with an ideal point of xi from voting for party j with a policy
position of zj is given by
uij(xi, zj, λj) = λij − β||xi − zj||2 + j (3.4)
where λij is the valence of the party j as perceived by voter i, ||xi − zj||2 is the
Euclidean norm, and the β is the parameter which determines the weight the voter
assigns to the policy relative to the valence.
The party is trying to maximize its vote share and has two decision variables in
order to do that. One is the policy position on the policy space, zj, and the other is a
“bribing vector” λj, which is essentially an allocation vector of size n, which specifies
the amount of bribe the party is going to give to each voter subject to the budget
constraint. So the strategy of a party is a pair (zj, λj). Let z denote the vector of
party positions and Λ denote the vector of allocation vectors chosen by the parties.
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So the probability that voter i chooses party j is given by
ρij(z,Λ) = Pr[(uij(xi, zj, λj) > uij(xi, zk, λk),∀k 6= j] (3.5)
We will employ the usual logit link between the stochastic latent utility and the
probability of voting [Train, 2003]:
ρij(z,Λ) = Pr
[
(λik − λij)− β(||xi − zk||2 − ||xi − zj||2) > j − k,∀k 6= j
]
(3.6)
ρij(z,Λ) =
[
1 +
∑
k 6=j
exp[(λik − λij)− β(||xi − zk||2 − ||xi − zj||2)]
]−1
(3.7)
The objective of the political party is to maximize its expected vote share by
choosing an appropriate policy position and an allocation vector, subject to the budget
constraint and given the choices of other parties:
maxVj(z,Λ) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
ρij(z,Λ) (3.8)
s.t
∑
λij ≤ Bj (3.9)
where Bj is the total resources available to party j. Now we can define the equilibrium
concept we are using.
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Definition 1 The vector (z∗,Λ∗) = [(z∗1 , λ
∗
1), ..., (z
∗
p , λ
∗
p)] ∈ (Xp,Rnp) is a local Nash
equilibrium (LNE) of the game of machine politics if and only if for all j ∈ P , there
exists a neighborhood Xj × Rnj of (z∗j , λ∗j) in (X × Rn) such that
Vj((z
∗
1 , λ
∗
1), ..., (z
∗
j , λ
∗
j), ..., (z
∗
p , λ
∗
p)) > Vj((z
∗
1 , λ
∗
1), ..., (zj, λj), ..., (z
∗
p , λ
∗
p))
∀(zj, λj) ∈ (Xj × RNj )− {(z∗p , λ∗p)}
We know that this equilibirium exists [Schofield, 2003]. What we are interested
about this equilibrium concept is its predictions given the empirical estimates of the
voter positions and budget constraints of the parties. For this purpose we move on
to do the simulations of this equilibrium using empirical data.
3.4.2 Simulating the Equilibria
One advantage of using a stochastic voting model is the possibility of working with
any empirical distribution of voter positions, and simulate the equilibrium predictions
[Schofield and Sened, 2006]. In our case, the moving components are the voter ideal
positions and relative budgets available to parties. In fact, given an estimate of voter
ideal points on a policy space and the limits on the “clientelistic budgets” available
to parties, we can simulate different equilibrium predictions which specifies the policy
positions choices of the parties together with whom the parties would bribe by which
amount for a given β.
The steps involved in the simulation procedure are as follows:
82
1. Estimate the empirical distribution of voter ideal positions from surveys using
factor analysis.
2. Estimate the party positions using expert surveys/content analysis.
3. Estimate the model parameters using a multinomial logit model. (In this case,
it is the distance coefficient, β.)
4. Use these model parameters to simulate the equilibria using a MATLAB code.
(Positions and “bribing vectors”.)
5. Get insights into questions like:
(a) Which party will target which voters?
(b) How would the possibility of bribing affect the policy position of parties?
(c) How would budget differentials affect the policy position of parties?
I present some simulation results using data for US 2008 elections. The data
and the estimates comes from an earlier work [Schofield et al., 2011]. By doing this,
I do not argue that clientelistic linkages exist in the US, rather I am using it as
an experiment to illustrate the empirical implications of the model. Since it is the
relative sizes of the budget which is important, I will arbitrarily choose some budget
sizes. Also, since the simulation takes quite a long time, I only use some random 150
voters from the original dataset.
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The figures in Appendix A illustrates some equilibrium outcomes for different
budget differentials9. Since the strategy space available to parties quite rich, the
multiplicity of equilibria is inevitable. In fact these “local equilibria” are highly
dependent on the initial values of the decision variables. The size of the circles around
the voter ideal points are proportional to the reward they receive in the equilibrium.
The red filled circle is the reward delivered by Party 1 and the blue circle is the
reward delivered by Party 2. There are voters who have not received any reward,
they are represented just by “x”. Figure 3.3 shows the pure strategy equilibrium
with no clientelistic linkage. Obviously the parties converge to the electoral mean in
this case [Schofield, 2004].
Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 show the equilibria for the case where the budget difference
between parties is relatively small and for different initial policy positions for the
parties. (All initial reward vectors are taken as zero vectors.) There are a number
of things to note here. First of all, the existence of a clientelistic linkage diverges
the equilibrium party positions away from the electoral mean. The second point is
that there can be multiple equilibria where different policy positions are supported
by different rewarding vectors. Apart from the voters who do not receive any reward
from any party, there exist voters who receive rewards from both of the parties. This
might seem problematic at first sight. This however is a stochastic voting model, and
the fact that one party gives more reward than the other party does not necessarily
9The initial party positions are ((0, 0), (0, 0)) for Figures 3.3, 3.5 and 3.8; ((1,−1), (−1, 1))
for Figures 3.4, 3.6 and 3.7; and ((0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0)) for Figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. The spatial
coefficient, β, is 0.756 in all cases.
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mean that the voter is going to vote for the party, rather it means that it increases
the chances of the voter voting for that party. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the cases for
a much larger budget differential between the parties. As it can be seen, there can
be an equilibrium where the party positions converge and the “rich” party makes a
more homogeneous reward distribution and an equilibrium where the party positions
diverge and the rich party distributes more benefits to the voters who are on the “one
side of the policy space” albeit rewarding everyone. In both cases the richer party
gets 98% of the votes.
Next we move on to the case where we introduce a third party. Figure 3.9 shows an
equilibrium where there is no budget difference among parties. The parties are close
to the electoral mean and they all have a relatively homogeneous reward allocation.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the case where there is only one machine party. The machine
party is almost at the electoral mean and distribute benefits to all voters. The other
two parties are located at the same position, which is not surprising. The case where
there are two machine parties is illustrated in figure 3.11. The machine parties are at
the center where as the other party located outside (close to lower left hand corner).
This observation is in line with the previous observations [Schofield et al., 2009] that
since they have a comparative advantage in attracting the votes given everything
else constant, the high valence parties will locate them closer to the electoral mean
and the low valence parties will stay out where they can get some votes through a
comparative advantage they have in ideological proximity.
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3.5 Conclusion
The model developed in this paper has a potential to provide insights in problems
which are quite different than the clientelistic linkage. In fact any setting in which
actors are trying to maximize support by choosing a policy position and a bribing
vector, hence any ”support buying” situation, will be a potential application. For an
example, consider the voting game in the United Nations Security Council. It has
been demonstrated that bribing is actually happening in the Security Council through
different means such as foreign aid or IMF lending [Kuziemko and Werker, 2006]. In
this context, one can extend the model such that the countries who are willing to
be bribed also choose their policy positions strategically to get the highest benefit
possible. Considering the fact that there will be domestic political constraints on the
countries’ choices in the international arena, this might be interesting way to look
at the “two-level game” logic within the context of “large country bribing the small
country.” In this case for instance, the domestic constraint on the large countries will
be about the “bribing strategy” where as for the small country it will more about
the degree to which the country should make compromise in return for the benefit
it receives. How the institutional rules affect the equilibria would be an interesting
direction to pursue.
There are many other tasks which are left for further studies. Replicating the
simulation for different countries and different electoral systems to gain real insights
is a crucial next step. One important theoretical extension would be to relax the
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exogenous budget constraint assumption. This can be done through introducing
lobby groups, who provide financial support to political parties, to the model. So
in this setup, while deciding which policy position to choose, the parties will try
to maximize their “income” as well as capturing votes by minimizing the distance.
Another related point is that in the current formulation of the model, the unused
portion of the budget do not affect the utility of the party hence parties distribute
all of their budgets. The model can be extended so as to incorporate this.
Also on the empirical side, the argument that the politicians are in fact treating
bribing as a tool for valence buying should be supported using further evidence. There
is a clear cognitive aspect of the problem related to voters. The voters might feel guilty
if they received the benefit and fail to vote for that party. This might be more valid
in cultures where “doing something in return of what you receive is a form integrity.”
So experimental studies with voters would provide useful information. Surveys with
politicians is also natural candidate for this purpose.
Monitoring groups of voters then rewarding and punishing them is much more
efficient than monitoring and then rewarding and punishing individuals especially
where party networks are weak and the electorate is large and dispersed over wide
geographical areas [Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a]. This fact is further strengthened
by the existence of groups with high level of cohesion such as ethnic or religious groups.
In these cases the clientelistic linkage can be sustained through a self-enforcing group
equilibrium where within monitoring and punishment mechanisms prevail [Auyero,
2001]. Using the model presented here to investigate this mode of citizen-politician
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linkage is not difficult. Theoretically, nothing would be different, just interpret voters
as groups. Using the survey data we can find the median voter for each of these
relevant groups (electoral districts, ethnic groups, religious minorities etc.) and run
the simulation treating these median voters as the set of voters and weighting them
with the respective sizes of the groups they belong to.
The relationship between the political space, including the distribution of voter
ideal positions, and the possibility of bribing is another question which deserves atten-
tion. When is ”corruption” more likely? Do more polarized systems lead to higher
incentives of bribing? Would the lack of a salient policy dimension increases the
chances of clientelistic linkages? Investigating these and similar questions might yield
valuable information which connects the clientelism discussions with other important
problems of political economy.
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Appendix A: Simulation Results
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Figure 3.3. No Clientelistic Linkage
90
Figure 3.4. Small Budget Difference Between Parties
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Figure 3.5. Small Budget Difference Between Parties
92
Figure 3.6. Small Budget Difference Between Parties
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Figure 3.7. Large Budget Difference Between Parties
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Figure 3.8. Large Budget Difference Between Parties
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Figure 3.9. 3 Party Case: No Budget Difference Between Parties
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Figure 3.10. 3 Party Case: Single Rich Party Case
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Figure 3.11. 3 Party Case: Two Rich Parties Case
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Appendix B: MATLAB Codes for Simulation
% THIS FUNCTION FINDS THE LOCAL NASH EQUILIBRIUM BY RECURSIVELY
% CALLING THE FIND_BEST_RESPONSE FUNCTION
function f=find_local_nash(n,m,VV,beta,C,ffc,bud,tol)
% n: Number of voters
% m: Number of parties
% bud(m+2): Budgets of parties
% tol: Tolerance. The algorithm stops if the change in vote share
% is less than tol.
% VV(2xn): Voter positions
% beta(1x1): Distance coefficient
% ffc((m)x(n+2)): Initial values for decision variables.
% First two columns are policy positions of parties and the rest
% n columns are the rewards to each n voters.
max_differ=10;
differ=zeros(m,1);
shares=zeros(m,1);
while abs(max_differ)>tol
max_differ=0;
for k=1:m
A0=ffc(k,:)’;
[x,fval]=find_best_response_2(n,m,k,A0,C,VV,beta,bud,ffc);
differ(k)=max(abs(shares(k)-fval));
if (differ(k)>tol)
max_differ=differ(k);
end
ffc(k,:)=x’;
shares(k)=fval;
end
end
f=ffc;
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% THIS FUNCTION COMPUTES THE BEST RESPONSE OF A PARTY
% GIVEN OTHER PARTIES STRATEGIES
function [x,fval]=find_best_response_2(n,m,k,A0,C,VV,beta,bud,ffc)
% n: Number of voters
% m: Number of parties
% A0: Initial values
% k: Best response of which party?
% VV(2xn): Voter positions
% beta(1x1): Distance coefficient
% ffc((m)x(n+2)): Where to fix the rest of the party positions
% and bribes
A = sym (’A’, [n+2,1]);
svote=0;
di2=zeros(n,m);
for i=1:n
den=0;
di1=(VV(1,i)-A(1))^2+(VV(2,i)-A(2))^2;
for j=1:m
di2(i,j)=(VV(1,i)-ffc(j,1))^2+(VV(2,i)-ffc(j,2))^2;
if ~(j==k)
den=den+exp(ffc(j,i+2)-beta*di2(i,j));
end
end
V1=exp(A(i+2)-beta*di1)/(den+exp(A(i+2)-beta*di1)) ;
svote=svote+V1;
end
V1=vpa(-svote/n,2);
fhc=matlabFunction(V1,’vars’,{A});
Aeq=[];beq=[];lb=zeros(n+2);lb(1)=-10;lb(2)=-10;ub=[];
options=optimset(’Algorithm’,’active-set’);
[x,fval] = fmincon(fhc, A0, C, bud(k),Aeq,beq,lb,ub,[],options);
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% THIS CODE PLOTS THE SIMULATION OUTPUT
n=150;
ffc = zeros(2,n+2);
ffc(:,1)=[0,0]; % First party initial position
ffc(:,2)=[0,0]; % Second party initial position
C=zeros(1,n+2)+1; C(1,1)=0; C(1,2)=0; % Constraint matrix
bud=[0,0]; %Budgets
temp=find_local_nash_2(n,m,VV,beta,C,ffc,bud,tol);
parties=temp(:,(2:3));
bribes=100*abs(temp(:,(4:n+3)));
bribes(bribes==0) = 0.00000001;
voters=VV(:,(1:n));
figure(18)
axis([-1.7 2.5 -2.2 3])
scatter(voters(1,:),voters(2,:),’x’,’black’)
hold on
scatter(voters(1,:),voters(2,:),bribes(1,:),’filled’,’r’)
hold on
text(parties(1,1),parties(1,2),’P1’)
hold on
text(parties(2,1),parties(2,1),’P2’)
hold on
scatter(voters(1,:),voters(2,:),bribes(2,:),’blue’)
hold on
legend(’Voters’,strcat(’P1:’,num2str(bud(1))),
strcat(’P2:’,num2str(bud(2))));
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4. Uncertainty and Institutional Stability: Microbehavioral
Foundations
4.1 Introduction
As North points it out “A theory of institutional change is essential for further
progress in the social sciences...” [North, 1993]. In particular, this field of research
will help us better understand one of the greatest puzzles of political economy: the
diverse performance of societies and economies. Developing tools for this purpose
is also an important part of a bigger project of enhancing the ability of the social
sciences to unpack the complexity of dynamic situations [Ostrom and Basurto, 2011].
In this paper I offer a rational choice model of conceptualizing institutional change
and stability based on actors’ trust in the future of the institution. The novel part
of the paper is that I use stochastic discount factors as the moving component of the
model, one approach which has not yet been used before in the study of institutions.
Rational choice approaches made significant contribution to the study of institu-
tions and institutional change in the last couple of decades. The main advantage of
this approach is that it demands a well-defined relationship between human behavior
and institutions [Hall and Taylor, 1996]. There are different methodologies within
the rational choice school of institutionalism. Calvert, 1995 distinguishes between
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three different views within the rational choice approach: i) institutions as features
of individual preferences, ii) institutions as ”rules of the game” and iii) institutions
as equilibria of behavior in an underlying game.
Although this institutions as equilibria approach is very well-suited to explain the
persistence of institutions, explaining institutional change remains as an important
challenge. The reason is that the equilibrium, by definition, is a ”no change situation”
in which only shared beliefs corresponding to self-enforcing behavior can rationally
prevail [Calvert, 1995]. So if institutions are equilibria of some underlying game and
equilibria are steady-states, how can we explain institutional change while staying in
the institutions as equilibria approach?
A new classification of the approaches in rational choice institutionalism is pro-
vided in Aoki, 2007. Aoki distinguishes between two views within the rational choice
paradigm: the exogenous view and the endogenous view. The former view treats
institutions as pre-determined rules outside the domain of interactions where as the
latter treats those rules as something spontaneously and endogenously determined.
The first approach is elaborated further and summarized as institutions as game forms
and the second approach is summarized as institution as an endogenous equilibrium
outcome of a game.
This chapter proposes a theory which brings together insights from both the in-
stitutions as game form view and institutions as equilibria view. I present a model of
institutional change based on repeated games with stochastic discount factors and ar-
gue that this approach is very intuitive and natural in capturing the micro-behavioral
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foundations of institutions. To put simply, I interpret discount factors as actors’ con-
fidence in the institutions and, using a very recent result [Barlo and Urgun, 2012],
I show that temporary yet arbitrarily long sequences of non-cooperative behavior is
inescapable in repeated social interactions. In contrast with the earlier literature,
switches between self-enforcing and self-undermining institutions are possible in the
same equilibrium specification. This transition allows us to account for periods of
instabilities from which institutions eventually recover.
In section 3.2 I review the different approaches in institutionalist school briefly.
Later I discuss some of the models in the theory of institutional change more closely.
Section 3.3 develops the main model of the essay. I conclude by making some general
remarks and speculating on directions for future research.
4.2 Discussion of the Relevant Literature
One can argue that the study of institutions is as old as the study of the socio-
economic systems [Schotter, 1981]. During this long history, institutions have been
studied using quite distinct methodologies. Within this tradition, the ”new institu-
tionalism” emerged as an umbrella term which itself consists of different bodies of
thought developed in the last four decades [March and Olsen, 2006]. There are three
such main schools of thought: historical institutionalism, sociological institutional-
ism, and rational choice institutionalism [Hall and Taylor, 1996]. Summarizing all of
the literature on institutions and institutional change will exceed the limits of a single
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essay so I will focus on the literature which is more closely related to the arguments
developed in the present article.
Historical institutionalism is based on macro-historical research and its emphasis
is on how institutions emerge from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes
[Thelen, 1999]. The basic and simple idea is that the policy choices made when
an institution is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will have a continuing
and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future [Peters, 2005].
One description of this idea is “path dependency”: when a government program
or organization embarks upon a path there is an inertial tendency for those initial
policy choices to persist [Krasner, 1984]. This does not mean that this path cannot
be altered. However it requires a good deal of political and social pressure to produce
that change. This logic is formalized in the “punctuated equilibrium” concept. This
is rather a metaphor borrowed from Darwinian theory of evolution akin to mutation
in the genes of living organisms. This approach however does not help much in
understanding institutional change. What causes these “mutations”? Where exactly
is that “punctuation point”? It might be a viable explanation ex post but ex ante
it seems tautological. Hence explaining institutional change remains a puzzle for
historical institutionalism.
The sociological work on institutions can be traced back to Max Weber and Emile
Durkheim. One problem with this literature is that the distinction between institu-
tions ans organizations are not clear. In fact the methodology of sociological insti-
tutionalism can be seen as a institutional perspective on organizations [Mohr, 1982].
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It is concerned with the process of creating values and cognitive frames within an
organization than it is with the end state —the differences among organizations that
can predict the behavior of those institutions and individuals within them [Peters,
2005]. Sociologist has a functionalist take on institutional change: institutions will
find means of adapting to changes in the environment. One alternative view is that
institutions will shape their environments to meet their own needs, rather than pas-
sively responding to those environments [Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978]. This view may
be especially valid for political institutions which may have the power to manipu-
late the socio-political environment in ways that suit them. These being said, an
explicit theory of institutional change does not seem to exist within the sociological
institutionalism literature [Finnemore, 1996].
Among these three schools of institutional analysis, the school of rational choice
institutionalism has had a growing dominance since it was first introduced more
than three decades ago [Schotter, 1981]. It has become an engine of social scientific
research, producing theoretical micro-foundations and deductively derived theorems
which yield testable hypotheses [Shepsle, 2006]. It is sometimes identified as a more
general social scientific methodology [Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003]. Although it is
usually treated as a unified body of methodologies [Green and Shapiro, 1994], there
are different varieties of rational choice institutionalism. In one of the pioneering
works in the field Calvert, 1995 distinguishes between three different views within
the rational choice approach: i) institutions as features of individual preferences,
ii) institutions as ”rules of the game” and iii) institutions as equilibria of behavior
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in an underlying game. The first approach embeds the arguments for cooperation,
observance of social norms, altruism and other relevant behavioral characteristics in
the utility function of the actor [Margolis, 1984]. The ”rules of the game” approach
on the other hand, treats institutions as constraints on human behavior. [North,
1981, North, 1981, Shepsle and Weingast, 1987]. The third approach conceptualizes
institutional arrangements as game theoretic equilibria for which no relevant actor
has an incentive to deviate [Bates et al., 1998].
The usual theoretical toolkit employed in the institutions as equilibria approach
is the theory of repeated games, in particular, repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a simple but strikingly powerful illustration of why ra-
tional actors might end up at the inefficient equilibria while searching for what is
best for them. One ”solution” to this pessimistic result comes from the theory of
repeated games. It can be shown that if rational actors play the Prisoner’s Dilemma
repeatedly, and if the actors value the future payoffs sufficiently enough, it is very
well possible that they end up at the cooperative/efficient outcome [Axelrod, 1981].
It this cooperative outcome which is defined as ”the institution” in the institutions
as equilibria approach [Greif and Laitin, 2004].
One important conceptual remark which is crucial for our purposes here is that,
although it has been called in that way right from the beginning [Schotter, 1981],
what is referred by institutions as equilibria approach is really ”institutions as the
outcomes of equilibria” [Shepsle, 2006]. To see this more clearly one should note the
difference between strategies and outcomes in game theory. Strategies in repeated
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game theory should define “complete and contingent plans” [Osborne, 2004]. This
means that strategies are objects which specify which actions to choose at every stage
of the game. And equilibria are particular strategy profiles, meaning a vector which is
composed of a single strategy for every player, from which no player has an incentive
to deviate. On the other hand, outcomes are the payoff profiles which are determined
by those strategies. The focus of the institutions as equilibria approach is not on the
strategies themselves, the focus is on the existence of strategies which will support
the cooperative equilibrium.
Aoki, 2007 focuses on exactly this conceptual difference and distinguishes be-
tween two views within the rational choice paradigm: the exogenous view and the
endogenous view. Based on this distinction he proposes the following definition for
an institution:
An institution is self-sustaining, salient patterns of social interactions, as
represented by meaningful rules that every agent knows and are incorpo-
rated as agents shared beliefs about how the game is played and to be
played.
The exogenous view treats institutions as pre-determined rules outside the domain
of interactions where as the endogenous view treats those rules as something spon-
taneously and endogenously determined.1 The first approach is elaborated further
1One can note that this distinction is similar to distinction between institutions as rules of the
game and institutions as equilibria of the game categories provided in Calvert, 1995
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and summarized as institution as a game form and the second approach is labeled as
institution as an endogenous equilibrium outcome of a game.
In this study I will be treating institutions as game forms as in Aoki’s categoriza-
tion but I will be using the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma as the technical toolkit. I
will now comparatively discuss the theories of institutional change in the literature.
4.2.1 Institutions: Rules or Equilibria ?
Before moving on, let me summarize the main concepts of game theory which I
will be referring to throughout the discussion.
Any strategic game can be characterized by four pieces of information: i) a set of
players, ii) sets of strategies available to the players, iii) an outcome function which
assigns an outcome for every strategy profile and iv) player’s preferences over these
outcomes. Usually iii and iv are merged together under the name of a payoff function,
a function which assigns payoffs to each player for every possible strategy profile and
players prefer the highest payoff.
Equilibrium concepts are developed to predict the possible strategy profile outcomes-
hence payoff distributions—of a given game. Nash equilibrium for instance assumes
that all players will choose the strategy which is a best response to what other play-
ers choose. If this is an extensive form game, then subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
concept requires that each player chooses a strategy which is a best response to every
other player at each point in the game where the player gets to move. One important
point to note is that if there is any uncertainty in the game, besides actions, any equi-
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librium specification has to include the beliefs of the players about that uncertainty
under which such actions will be chosen by the players. Even in the perfect infor-
mation case the reason why we expect Nash equilibrium to occur is that we assume
that each player believes that other players are going to play their best responses for
sure. In other words all game theoretic equilibrium concepts specify a belief structure,
whether it is explicit or implicit.
One recent rational choice theoretic approach to institutional change has been
developed in Greif and Laitin, 2004. This ’endogenous theory of institutional change’
has been elaborated further and supported by historical narrative in Greif, 2006.
Since it is the theoretically closest work, I will discuss the framework developed in the
latter in more detail in this section. Throughout the discussion I will also compare
and contrast it to the ideas of North on institutional change [North, 1981, North,
1990,North, 1993].
Similar to Calvert, 1995’s categorization mentioned above, Greif makes a distinc-
tion between three approaches to institutional analysis: institutions as rules, insti-
tutions as equilibria and as shared beliefs motivating equilibrium play. He places
North’s approach into the first category.
In the game-theoretic approach, institutions are considered as either
equilibria..., the shared beliefs motivating equilibrium play ..., or the rules
of the game [Greif, 2006].
His approach is an extension of the institutions as equilibria approach:
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Institutions are not game-theoretic equilibria, games are not the basic
unit of institutional analysis, and game theory does not provide us with a
theory of institutions. Indeed, the key to advancing institutional analysis
by using game theory is precisely to recognize the difference between game-
theoretic equilibrium analysis and institutional analysis.
His extension relies on how he extends the definition of and institution. He views
institutions as ”interrelated systems as rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that
together generate a regularity of (social) behavior”. To stress the difference he makes
his approach and North’s approach, for Greif, what causes the regularities of human
behavior is not a monolithic entity such as a rule but a system of interrelated ele-
ments. One of the many examples he gives for this institutions as systems model is
the following:
Rule: Rules of the road.
Organizations: Departments of motor vehicles and law enforcement officials.
Beliefs and Internalized Norms: Beliefs that other drivers and law enforcement offi-
cials will behave in a particular way.
Implied Regularity of Behavior: Driving according to the rules.
When you see the green light you will not stop. The reason you do not stop is
your belief about how others will behave: you believe that the ones who see the red
light will stop and if not they will be punished. Why will the others stop at the red
light ? Because they believe that the ones who see the green light will not. Moreover
there is a chance that a law enforcement official will catch you doing that and you will
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be punished. Hence in this game of traffic lights, the equilibrium is stopping at the
red light and not stooping at the green light and the equilibrium outcome is driving
according to the rules. This equilibrium is enforced by the beliefs of the players.
One important point to note in this model is the role that the organizations play.
What they do is to constrain the set of beliefs and actions of individuals. This set
of restricted action space can be seen as the set of rules, and the set of restricted
beliefs as the beliefs and internalized norms of Greif’s setup. Hence if we compare
this setup with a strategic game form summarized above, the organization is the only
part which is not explicitly stated in a game form. However since every equilibrium
concept has to specify a consistent set of beliefs which support the equilibrium payoff
profile, one can think of organizations as they are embedded in the black box of belief
formation process.2
So if we employ this approach, any change in any of the first three components
of this system, namely rules, organizations or beliefs, will be an institutional change.
For instance, even if rules are the same, if you live in a corrupted country and if you
believe that law enforcement officials will not punish the ones who do not stop at red
lights then that means you are in a different institution. Accordingly, your incentive
to stop at the red lights will decrease and you will at least slow down at the green
light rather than proceeding without thinking because you know that others might
not stop at the red light. Hence a different institutional system which results in a
different equilibrium.
2Indeed there is a vast literature in game theory on belief formation and belief refinements.
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However if you live in a country where rules are such that you can pass at the
green light and pass slowly at the red light, this will be another different institutional
system and the equilibrium outcome will also be different. But note that the im-
plied regularity of the behavior, namely driving according to the rules, will be the
same. In other words, in Greif’s setup implied regularity of behavior and the implied
equilibrium outcome are two different things.
Although this approach offers a wider and unified perspective it also brings about
problems in terms of theoretical analysis. According to this model, in a social context
there is almost nothing but institutions. This implies that there is no room for
exogenous change and all changes have to be endogenous. The problem is similar to
the identification problem in statistics. It is not possible to include everything in your
model because it is not possible to make inferences out of models with zero degrees of
freedom. The relevant problem for the purposes of this chapter appears in modeling
institutional change or stability. As discussed above, we cannot be referring to a
single entity by an institution. If we want to model a change using the broad definition
above, we need to incorporate all possible changes that can occur in that institutional
system. However it is not clear how this broad definition of an institution is used in
the way Greif models institutional change and reinforcement. His formal model of
reinforcement is based on a commonly used repeated interaction setting where rules or
organizations are not explicitly incorporated. As we will see in more detail in the next
section, the survival of an institution—hence a no change situation—is represented
by the equilibrium in which all players cooperate and reinforcement mechanism is
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modeled as positive shocks to payoffs. To sum up, I argue that Greifs model of
institutional change does not use his own extended definition of an institution but
the common limited definition which treats institutions as the equilibrium outcome
of an underlying repeated game.
Now let’s turn to North and try to understand what he means by “institutions
are the rules of the game”. If we are talking about the rules of strategic game, which
component of the game form do we mean by this ? Do institutions stand for the set
of available strategies ? Or do they determine the payoff function ? Can institutions
sometimes determine the set of players ?
Think of the criminal law as an institution. Supposedly, it is rule of the crime
game. For instance, say, if one convicts a murder, the law judges for execution. So
being executed is a “payoff” for the strategy you have chosen. Hence can we say in
this case the institution shows itself as the payoff function ? But where are the other
players ? Is this really a strategic game ?
When we look at North’s theory closer, we see that what he means by “the rules
of the game” is basically an agreement or a contract among players rather than some
notion related to a strategic game.
The process of institutional change can be described as follows. A
change in relative prices leads one or both parties to an exchange, whether
it is political or economic, to perceive that either or both could do bet-
ter with an altered agreement or contract. An attempt will be made to
renegotiate the contract.
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Hence the strategic part of North’s theory starts with the bargaining process
about choosing the new agreement or contract, i.e, a new institution. The context
for which an institution serves as the rules of the “game” —“an exchange whether it
is political or economic”—and the actual strategic game in which these are rules are
determined are treated as two distinct parts of the social environment. When North
uses the phrase “institutions are rules of the game”, he is not necessarily referring to
a strategic game.3 The institutional change takes place only after at least one party
realizes that he can do better with a new contract. After that the new institution
emerges as the equilibrium of the “renegotiation game”. In other words, the new
institution which emerges as an equilibrium of a bargaining game serves as the rules
of the game for the corresponding human interaction setting.
In summary, even if Greif and North start with different definitions of an institu-
tion, if we look at the underlying mechanisms more carefully, there does not seem to
be a structural difference in the way they model the change and persistence. However
one difference is that in North’s setup, the game in which new institutions are deter-
mined and the context in which institutions constrain behavior are distinct. In Greif’s
setup on the other hand, there exists a single game in which institutions persist as
a self-enforcing equilibrium—or change as a self-undermining equilibrium—and it is
this equilibrium which also characterizes the nature of the interaction under investi-
gation. This is the point which leads to the concept of an “endogenous institution”
and “endogenous institutional ” change.
3It might be the case that the first “game” is actually a strategic game.
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4.2.2 Change: Endogenous or exogenous ?
For North,
The agent of change is the individual entrepreneur responding to the
incentives embodied in the institutional framework. The sources of change
are changing relative prices or preferences [North, 1990].
In other words, the engine of change in North’s framework is the purposive maxi-
mizing behavior of economic organizations. Organizations with sufficient bargaining
strength might find it profitable to renegotiate the existing “contracts” to change
them a way that favors them.
Since North is mainly interested in the effects of institution on economic life an
emphasize on the relative prices is understandable. However he argues that relative
price changes have broader effects on all institutions:
To the non-economist (and perhaps for some economists as well),
putting such weight on changing relative prices may be hard to under-
stand. But relative price changes alter the incentives of individuals in
human interaction, and the only other source of such change is a change
in tastes [North, 1990].
Thus if relative price changes are the sources of change, then any such change that
results from the maximizing efforts of entrepreneurs can be regarded as being endoge-
nous to the institutional change. Consider the R&D decisions of an industry. If the
technological developments lead to a new production system which does not need as
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much as labor the old one, i.e relative prices of labor decrease, than that industry
might have an incentive to renegotiate with the labor union with a greater bargaining
power. A war on the other hand, will be an exogenous factor which will increase the
relative price of the labor and the effects will be opposite in this case.
So North’s theory allows for endogenous changes as well as exogenous ones. I
want to reemphasize a point that I talked about in the previous section: the inter-
action/exchange part of the analytical framework in which institutions serve as the
“rules of the game” and the bargaining game in which institutions are determined
are distinct in his framework. Hence this endogeneity is structurally different than
how Greif approaches endogeneity, i.e, a single game where institutions are both
equilibrium outcome and the constraints on behavior.
On the other hand, if institutions are equilibria of a game, as in Greif’s case,
in which both interactions take place and the the survival of the institutions are
determined, then how do institutions change? The game-theoretic definition of an
equilibrium is by definition implies a “no-change” situation. Hence endogenous in-
stitutional change seems contradictory. Greif introduces a new paradigm of endoge-
nous institutional change around two concepts: quasi-parameters and institutional
reinforcement. Parameters are exogenous to the model and variables are endogenous.
Quasi-parameters are a third type; they are parameters in the short-run and variables
in the long run. So regarding to self-enforceability, they are parameters, regarding
to change in the long-run, they are variables. One can think of quasi-parameters as
pots in which marginal changes accumulate. A certain level of accumulation is needed
118
for it to be effective in changing the game form at hand. Maybe the most impor-
tant point about the distinction among parameters, variables and quasi parameters
is that it is observational, it is not possible to theoretically argue that something is
one of the three. I will now discuss the formal model Greif develops for institutional
reinforcement.
The technical toolkit Greif uses to formalize his theory is the theory of repeated
games. Take an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with the following stage
game payoffs
P1
P2
C C
C bt,bt −k,bt + e
D bt + e,−k 0,0
where b0, k, e > 0, and players share a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The model
has four parameters: δ, b0, k, and e. bt, is a quasi-parameter, since it can be affected
by the institution in place. The institution we are interested in is the one generating
cooperation, that is, stage-game play of (c,c).
Cooperation has a positive (negative, neutral) reinforcement if play of (c,c) in
period t implies that bt+1 − bt > (<,=)0. Standard repeated prisoner’s dilemma
models take cooperation to have neutral reinforcement. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that the change in cooperation payoffs under any reinforcement mechanism is
fixed over time, i.e, for all t, bt+1 − bt =  with  > (<,=)0 under positive (negative,
neutral) reinforcement.
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In this model it can be shown that the cooperation institution is self-enforcing
over a larger range of discount factors under positive reinforcement than under neu-
tral reinforcement. Moreover, under negative reinforcement, cooperation is not a
self-enforcing institution. The first proof is simple, just find the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium conditions for different each reinforcement mechanisms and com-
pare. The second proof is even more straightforward, apply backward induction given
that payoffs from mutual cooperation decrease by  every period if players have co-
operated in previous periods.
What does Greif’s theory tell us? Under positive reinforcement it is relatively eas-
ier4 to have the cooperative outcome and this is the case of institutional persistence.
Under negative reinforcement, on the other hand, the institution is not self-enforcing
hence will not survive. The collapse of this cooperative outcome, hence the collapse
of the institution is what Greif interprets as an institutional change.
An institution is however, either self-enforcing, self-undermining or neutral. So
there is no transition from a self-enforcing institution to self-undermining or vice
versa. This means that, given an institution, it is either going to live forever or
collapse for sure. In fact, it is this transition which we should be interested in if we
are interested in institutional change. Without doing it, it is as if we are explaining
stability with stability and change with change.
4In comparison to the neutral reinforcement, i.e., the standard repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
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4.2.3 Modeling transitions: Acemoglu and Robinson
Acemoglu and Robinson’s work [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005] emerged as a
significant contribution to the discussion of the role of institutions on economic and
political development. Although it is not explicitly about institutions or institutional
change, I believe their implicit treatment of institutional change is worth mentioning
as a side note in contrast to other models of change.
Their basic methodology is to analyze the conditions (such as distributional char-
acteristics, class structure or economic structure of a society) under which transitions
between different states of the world such as from non-democracy to democracy, a
revolution in a non-democracy or a coup in democracy occur. What makes their ap-
proach structurally different than North or Greif is that the equilibria of their models
are about whether a change will occur or not.
They emphasize the commitment value of institutions similar to North and Wein-
gast, 1989. In their theory, groups (rich, poor or middle class) that have political
power today can introduce political institutions that favor them. The political insti-
tutions of today in turn, regulate the allocation of political power in the future. In
other words, institutions make it possible to lock in groups political power. However
under certain conditions the ruling group “loses the game” and hence the institutions
which favor them cannot persist and new political institutions form which favor the
winner group. Their dynamic game-theoretic models provide parametric conditions
under which different changes or transition will take place.
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One basic notion of their theory is that institutions emerge as the equilibrium of a
game where the elites choose to give citizens political power under the threat of social
disorder when the costs of repression are too high. For instance, one of their propo-
sitions gives a critical level of the fraction of the income of the economy destroyed
during revolution, under which there will be a revolution. Another proposition gives
us the critical level of the fraction of capital and land lost during a coup under which
there will be a coup. In another proposition, they give different such levels for before
and after financial integration.
One might think that this approach would just give us discrete intervals for param-
eters for which change will occur, i.e, a sense of a punctuated equilibrium. However
since all these critical levels are stated as continuous functions of other model pa-
rameters, such as the tax rate, capital level, factor prices or the production function
specification, it allows us to do a rich set of comparative statics. Hence these models
give us all sorts of predictions about the direction and the degree of the effect if model
parameters on the change if interest (democratization, coup, revolution, financial in-
tegration etc.). For instance, if increasing the marginal product of capital decreases
the critical level of the fraction of capital and land lost during a coup under which
there will be a coup, that means chances of having a coup would be more difficult in
countries with higher marginal product of capital.
To conclude, the set of tools developed by Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005 offers
an alternative way of analyzing change: setting up a carefully parametrized dynamic
strategic—usually a variant of the bargaining—game on whether a change will oc-
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cur and use comparative statics analysis to make inference about the nature of the
phenomenon. Unlike North or Greif’s framework, the stability of an institution is
not characterized by identifying a reinforced equilibrium, rather it is characterized by
conditions under which the transition game does not result in a “change equilibrium”.
These are quite distinct methodologies.
4.3 The Model: Uncertainty and Change
The idea that arbitrary changes in expectations might influence the economy even
if they are not related to fundamental variables has been a widespread observation.
One can go back as early as Pigou:
The varying expectations of business men... and nothing else, constitute
the immediate cause and direct causes or antecedents of industrial fluctu-
ations [Pigou, 1967].
Institutions are not very different in this respect. There are many “sunspots”
which have contagious effects on the stability of institutions which come from outside
of their domains of interactions. Extrinsic uncertainty is one such sunspot with self-
fulfilling features [Cass and Shell, 1983]. The closest example is the recent financial
crisis. The loss of average confidence due to some failure in the U.S mortgage system
had world-wide catastrophic effects.
In this section I develop a model where uncertainty regarding to the future of an
institution is the mechanism which undermines the institution. I treat institutions as
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game forms which define social interactions [Aoki, 2007,Shepsle, 2006]. An institution
persists as long as the same game is played, and the same game is played as long as
actors cooperate in that game. In this sense, similar to Greif, 2006, I interpret the
occurrence “bad equilibrium outcome” as the reason for the collapse of the existing
institution, hence an institutional change. However, in contrast to Greif’s model, not
all such outcomes need to lead to a collapse. There might be a threshold of repetitions
of bad outcomes over which the current institution fails and a transition from bad
outcome state to good outcome state is possible. Hence, the model captures crisis
situations or “instability in institutions” which are recovered.
The mechanism I offer rests on the risk perceptions of the actors. Since the
introduction of the theory of rational expectations [Muth, 1961] we know very well
that uncertainty about the future of the institution is a crucial determinant of the
future of that institution.
The only way to capture the uncertainty component in a theoretical model is to
introduce a stochastic process to generate a variable of the model. I argue that the
discount factor is a natural candidate for this. One can interpret discount factors in
repeated games in two different but computationally equivalent ways. The first is the
common interpretation where players discount future payoffs exponentially by some
factor δ due to “time value of money”. In this case, the payoffs to the players will be
a finite or infinite sum of discounted stage game payoff. An alternative interpretation
of the same formulation would be the following: at each stage, the players believe
that they will be playing the same game next period with some probability, δ. So at
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each repetition of the game, players believe that there is a chance that the game will
stop. The expected return of this type of a formulation will be an infinite or infinite
sum which is equal to the discounted payoff of the previous formulation.
With the latter interpretation in mind, I interpret δ as a measure of the trust
the players have in the institution, or equivalently a measure of lack of uncertainty
regarding to the survival of the institution. So in interpretation of the survival of an
institution is the continuation of the game form itself. The failure of an institution
on the other hand, occurs when the bad outcome is realized for a certain period of
time during the game. If the trust in the institution —the belief hold by the players
that the same game form will repeat in the next period—is stochastic what can we
say about the equilibrium outcome, hence about the future of that institution? We
need a theory of repeated games with stochastic discounting in order to deal with
questions like this.
Surprisingly the work on repeated games with stochastic discounting is quite lim-
ited. To my knowledge, Baye and Jansen, 1996 is the first work which deals with
repeated games with stochastic discount factors. What they do is basically to prove a
folk theorem using stochastic discount factors. Their setting however does not allow
for history dependent stochastic discounting, something I need to have in order to
support my arguments. Recently Barlo and Urgun, 2012 provided a more compre-
hensive framework to study repeated games with stochastic discount factors. I will
follow the setup developed in that paper.
125
Let G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N) be a normal form game where N is the set of players
and Ai is the set of actions available to player i. Also let ui : A → R denote player
i’s payoff function where A = pii∈NAi and A−i = pij 6=Ai. In every period t ∈ N0,
a random variable, dt, is determined and this sequence forms a stochastic process
{dt}t∈N0 . The supergame is defined for a given stochastic process with the initial
discount factor being δˆ = rd0 and r ∈ (0, 1]. Then a k-stage history is given by
hk = ((ao, d1), ..., (ak−1, dk)) where dt is a realization of dt.
The players have complete information. This means, at every t each player ob-
serves all the previous action profiles and all the discount factor shocks including
those realized in period t. To stress it once again, players observe the current pe-
riod’s discount factor before making a move. All in all, this is a perturbation of the
standard repeated game setup.
In order to get an idea on what the strategies look like in a repeated game with
stochastic discounting consider the following generic form of 2-player repeated Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. Let b, c > 0, b > 1, b < c+ 2.
P1
P2
C D
C 1,1 −c,b
D b,−c 0,0
Let pi(0) be given by the repetitions of (C,C), pi(P ) the repetitions of (D,D), and
pi(NEq) be also the repetitions of (D,D). Then the strategy profile in which both
player play the following strategy is an equilibrium: If the shocks have all been such
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that the resulting oneperiod discount factors were greater or equal to δ∗ (i) play
(C,C) until some player unilaterally deviates from pi(0) and (ii) play pi(P ) if there
was a single player deviation, and (iii) continue playing pi(j), j = 0, P if there were
either no deviations or multi-player deviations; and if there is a period in which the
resulting oneperiod discount factors were strictly less than δ∗ play pi(NEq) , repetitions
of (D,D), for the rest of the game.
Below is a list of assumptions needed for the result I am interested in:
Assumption 1 The stage game has at least one pure strategy equilibrium.
Assumption 2 In every period, the players use the most up to date information
regarding to the state of the world.
Assumption 3 The stochastic process {dt}t∈N0 satisfies the following:
1. Markov property
2. Martingale property
3. The state space Ω of {dt}t is a subset of (0, 1)
4. Given Ω, the set of ergodic states, ΩE, is dense in Ω
5. For any  > 0, there exists τ ≥ t with Pr[dτ < |Ft] > 0 where Ft is the
information available at time t.
6. For any given state ω ∈ Ω ⊆ (0, 1), the set of states ω′ ∈ Ω that are reachable
from ω in a single period and satisfying ω < ω′, denoted by R(ω), is finite.
Moreover, for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω with ω′ ≥ ω, sup R(ω′) ≥ sup R(ω)
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7. d0 is non-stochastic.
Parts 1 and 2 of Assumption 3 simply implies that the expectations about the future
are equal to the current value and do not depend on anything else. Part 5 is an
important assumption and implies that there are states arbitrarily close to 0 and
such states can be reached with positive probability yet arbitrarily small probability
in the long-run. Part 6 is the standard bounded increments requirement. 5
Theorem 1 (Barlo and Urgun (2012)) If assumptions 1,2 and 3 hold, then, for
every K ∈ N, for every δ ∈ (0, 1), for every discounting process {dt} with d0 =
δ, for every subgame perfect strategy profile f of the repeated game with stochastic
discounting; there exists T which is almost surely in K ∈ N0, and the probability
of piτ (f) being a Nash equilibrium action profile of the stage game conditional on
the information available at s, equals 1, for all s = T, T + 1, ...T + K and for all
τ = s, s+ 1, ..., T +K.
The theorem basically says that, under assumptions 1,2 and 3, finite but arbitrar-
ily long consecutive repetitions of Nash profile of the stage game will almost surely
happen in finite time no matter which subgame perfect equilibrium strategy is consid-
ered and how high the initial common discount factor is. Moreover the prescription
of Nash behavior occurs whenever the current discount factor, which serves as the
expectation for the rest of the game, is sufficiently small, hence confidence level is
sufficiently low.
5Are these assumptions on the stochastic process too restrictive? One can note that the famous
Polya’s urn process and standard random walk satisfy all these requirements.
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For the case of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, this will mean that the non-cooperative
outcome 6 will certainly be observed no matter which subgame perfect equilibrium is
considered when the realized value of the discount factor is sufficiently small. More-
over, this repetition of non-cooperative outcome will not go on forever. Hence tran-
sitions between cooperation and non-cooperation phases will take place if the game
continues to be played7 So this theorem is both good news and bad news for the
persistence of cooperation. The bad news is that there will certainly be periods of
non-cooperation, and the good news is that they will not last forever.
To stress it once again, in my argument, the persistence of the cooperation phase
is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the persistence of the institution.
Since institution is the game form, it might persist even if players do not cooperate.
However, the elongation of this non-cooperation outcome will undermine the institu-
tion, and depending on the durability of the institution it might collapse leading way
to a new institution or recover and go back to cooperation outcome phase, which is
guaranteed to occur in finite time.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
On 15 July 1979, President Carter, in his address to the Americans about the
energy crisis, was drawing attention to “a subject even more serious than energy or
6Payoff profile of (0, 0) as a result of the strategy profile (D,D) in our example above.
7Note that this transition is not a change in the equilibrium, it is indeed an equilibrium which
is induced by more sophisticated strategies than the usual punishing strategies such as tit-for-tat
or grim trigger. The main reason is that the histories not only include the action profiles but the
realizations of the common stochastic discounting factor.
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inflation...a fundamental threat to American democracy.” That threat was a “crisis
of confidence” [Lipset and Schneider, 1983]. It turns out that President Carter was
correct to fear. Almost two decades later, when the insolvency of the investment bank
Lehmann Brothers triggered the worst financial and economic crisis since the 1930s,
scholars who were familiar with the notion of systemic trust were making predictions
that the biggest damage caused by the crisis is most likely that to citizens’ systemic
trust.
The crucial characteristic of systemic risk is that the instability caused or exacer-
bated by idiosyncratic condition can lead to a cascading failure through interlinkages
and interdependencies [De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000]. The loss of average con-
fidence in one part of the system can bring down the whole system. The point of
these arguments is that a random exogenous shock is one of the main ingredients of
institutional stability in a world of interconnected institutions as we line in today.
In this chapter I offered a theory of institutional change based on the dynamics of
actors’ trust in the institution to capture these dynamics. I argued that institutions
are game forms and the change in the game form occurs when the cooperation fails
within that institution for sometime. I showed that under some assumptions on
the stochastic process, the non-cooperation phase is inevitable in repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game with stochastic confidence levels in the institutions. I believe that
this is a strong way of conceptualizing the external shocks on behavioral beliefs which
trigger institutional change.
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Developing models of socio-economic systems which involve underlying microbe-
havioral foundations is an important task for the social scientists. We need to pay
attention to identify the conditions and processes which are likely to improve the effi-
ciency of society by facilitating coordinated action. Designing institutions which are
sturdy against uncertainties is becoming more important in a world where systemic
risks are becoming more and more common. The model in this chapter showed that
in a world of uncertainities, the cooperation between actors are going to fail sooner or
later and it might never recover. What are then the characteristics of those institu-
tions which seem to be sturdy against uncertainties? How can we design institutions
which are resistant against the shocks of confidence losses? This is a direction which
remains to be investigated furher both theoretically and empirically.
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